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New bloodbath engulfs East Tiln.or 
OVlO Broncos operating again 
The Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) launched a massive new 
military offensive in East Timor in August. According to press 
agency reports from Jakarta, 20,000 troops are being deployed , 
supported by combat aircraft, helicopters , tanks arid a variety of 
weapons. Timorese refugees who left Dili in the past few weeks 
report that Hercules transport aircraft are arriving every two or 
three days with paratroops and heavy equipment. OVlO 
Broncos, the counter-insurgency aircraft which caused so much 
devastation during the aerial bombardment in 1977and'1978, are 
in action again and have been-seen going on sorties to ,the eastern 
part of the country where resis.tance is 'particularly strong. 
The military _build-up in preparation for the offensive 
commenced in early August , immediately after the departure 
from Dili of the Australian Parliamentary mission (see page 10) . 
On 16_ August, Indonesia's Armed Forces chief, General Benny 
Murdani declared_ that ABRI would wipe out Fretilin if they 
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refused to surrender: "This time, no more fooling around. We 
are going to hit them without mercy. If this call goes unheeded , 
the government will use its armed forces and all its arsenal to 
clean up the remnants of Fretilin rebels" . (The Age , Melbourne, 
18 August, quoting a report in Sinar Harapan the previousday.) 
Murdani is reported to be determined to "finish the j<?b" of 
subjugating the people of East Timar, a job he,, himself sfar~ed 
neai-ly eight years ago when he commanded the invasion of Dili 
in December 1975. He has made known his determination fo 
capture· Xanana, the Fretilin commander, and crush · all 
resistance by 1 October this year, and present this "victory gift" 
to Suharto on the 18th anniversary of the events in 1965 which 
ushered in military rule. 
Rapid military build-up under way 
At the beginning · of September, Australfan Senator · Ted 
Robertson drew attention in Darwin to alarming reports of a 
large-scale build-up of Indonesian troops and equipment in Dili 
and Baucau. Darwin is a likely spot for such information to 
surface because of .its proximity to East Timar and the Timorese 
refugees there who maintaip contact with their homeland. 
Already several months eailier' in June, ·contacts in Jakarta 
had been warning activist groups abroad that Murdani was 
preparing a new onslaught in East Timor. On 25 J1:1ne, he sept a 
letter to the Fretilin commander saying that a new campaign, . 
Operation Unity (Operasi Persatuan) would be launched on 17th 
August unless Fretilin surrendered. In July he visited East Timor 
with Major-General Gunarso (Assistant Defence Minister for 
Social and Political Affairs), Major General Dading Kalbuadi 
(Assistant Defence Minister for Logistics, arid an old hapd at 
waging war against the people of East Tim or), Brig-Gener,a(E;di 
Nayaprala (Assistant bef,ence Minister for Territorial Affaifs) 
and Colonel Ben.Momongan (Deputy-Assistant for Operational 
Affairs). This visit was part of the preparations for Operation 
Unity. Jakarta oress reports quoted Murda-ni as delivering 
messages to the troops which were directly related to the 
forthcoming operations . The words he used also indicated fury at 
the widespread support for the resistance struggle in East Timar 
recently manifested inmany parts of the world . "We have paid 
heavy sacrifices to defend the unity of the Republic . of 
Indonesia," he said. "They should not believe statements bemg 
made abroad, because there is no country in the world that can 
help them split the united Republic of Indonesia." (Sinar 
Harapan, 15 July, 1983 .) 
Army takes complete control of 
East Timor 
The Army js now in complete control of government 
administration of EastTimor and the territory has been plunged 
into a Virtual state of war. Non-military personnel have been 
withdrawn and Mario Carrascalao, the puppet Timorese 
goyef~or, has been declared "non-active"; he now moves around 
under the escort of four paratroops . One clear sign of Murdani's 
"no-fooling-around" policy is the removal of Colonel Purwanto 
·as commander of Korem 164/Wira Dharma, the military 
command in East Timar. Purwanto was the man who entered 
into negotiations with the Fretilin commander, Xanana, in 
March this year, which led to a ceasefire that held for nearly five 
. months. Although Indonesia took no further steps to support the 
approaches made during the negotiations, the very fact that talks 
had taken place on Indonesia's initiative completely discredited 
Indonesian claims that Fretilin is a "spent force". The flood of 
information reaching the outside world about conditions inside 
East Timor;___,photographs of atrocities, tapes, doc.umen.ted 
reports, information about Fretilin-controlled areas and leaked 
Indonesian military instruction manuals-has seriously breached 
the tight blockade .of news · from East Timar, much to the 
embarrassment of Murdani and his general staff. 
Additional moves taken to support Indonesia's offensive 
include: 
- The suspension of all International Red Cross activities 
since early July. The ICRC in Geneva has not yet explained 
the reasons, but it is well to recall that its activities were 
suspended in April 1981, just prior to the launching of 
Operation Security. 
- Departures from Dili of Timorese to join families abroad 
have been stopped. · 
- A 6pm curfew has been imposed in the towns. 
- Mass arrests have taken place in Dili and Baucau, and 
many prisoners, including those until recently held in 
Comarca Prison, Dili, have been transferred to detention 
centres in Bali. 
HSXJ&W~ 
right for its time. 
Indonesia now has two squadrons of Hawk ground attack aircraft. Could these be in operation now in East Timor? 
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Interview -with 
former Bishop of EaSt Timor 
Monseignor Martinhu da Costa Lopez, Apostolic Administrator of East Timar from 1977till1983, was known as the Bishop of Dili. In May 
this year, he was persuaded to resign. He then decided to leave East Timar. After spending a few weeks in the Vatican to report on the situation, 
he went to Portugal, having refused a post offered to him in Rome. In September he visited London, Dublin, Paris and Holland and met many 
groups, spoke to Parliamentarians, gave press conferences and met government representatives. While in London, he gave the following 
interview to T APO L : 
When did you become a priest? 
I studied at a minor seminary in East Timor, then after four . 
years , I went to a major seminary in Macau, where I studied 
philosophy and theology . I returned to East Timor and I was 
ordained in 1948. I was sent to many places in the country as a 
missionary and then !,became the head of a Seminary in Dili. In 
1958, I was elected by the people of Timor to represent them in 
the National Assembly in Lisbon, the Portuguese parliament, so I 
went to Lisbon for four years as an Assembly member. . 
Which party did you represent?. 
In those days there was only one party , the government party . 
Then after serving in the Assembly for four years, I returned 
home to work again as a priest and do missionary work. In 1977, I 
was appointed to replace the Bishop of Dili, Father Ribeiro , and 
became the Apostolic Administrator, a position I held until 1983 . 
What were your personal experiences of the Indonesian invasion in 
1975? 
When the Indonesians invaded, this was the start of a period of 
massacres , torture , capturing people , arresting any suspect, in the 
middle of the night . Many people were killed, right from the very 
first day of the invasion. They were terrible times . 
Three periods of the war 
Were you in Dili on the day of the invasion? 
Yes I was. And from the very start, I was deeply concerned 
with everything that was happening. 
I think we can divide the war since 1975 into 3 periods: the first 
was from 1975 till 1979, the second was from 1979 till 1982, and 
the third is the present period. The first period was characterised 
by horrifying massacres, tortures, mass arrests. We try not to 
remember the things that happened in those days, because it is 
all just too painful. So many people were killed. The second 
period was characterised by what we call the Timorisation of the 
war. The Indonesian military, probably because they were not 
able to fight against Fretilin and because they lost so many 
soldiers, started to select young Timorese men, took them to 
Bali for military training, then brought them back to Timor and 
made them fight against Fretilin. So in the first period, the war 
was between Indonesians and Timorese but now it was between 
Timorese and Timorese. The Timorese soldiers were put in two 
special battalions, Battalions 744 and 745, and also in Hansip 
(the civil guard). 
The third period started from the ceasefire. The first 
approaches were made in 1982, but the ceasefire actually started 
in March 1983. I watched this with great interest, hoping it would 
lead to a dialogue between Fretilin and Indonesia, but as we now 
know, the dialogue was not continued, and the ceasefire has been 
broken. The Indonesian military have launched a new , big 
offensive. 
With this new offensive , I am very afraid for the fate of the 
civilian population, the defenceless people, women and children , 
the old and the sick . I don't fear for the Fretilin, because they have 
so much experience of fighting , and plenty of weapons; I am quite 
certain they will be able to resist this offensive . But the civilians 
are the ones who will suffer. I think it is extremely important for 
all humanitarian organisations and solidarity groups, as well as 
Catholic organisations like the Commissions for justice and 
peace, and foreign governments, to be made aware of this new 
invasion . They must do something to stop the bloodshed that will 
occur, do something to alleviate the terrible sufferings of the 
people of East Timor. 
What was the attitude of the Catholic Church at the time of the 
invasion? 
At first , the church was powerless to do anything. We had no 
idea what would happen . Everybody in Dili stayed at home 
because they were so terrified of the Indonesian soldiers. Many 
. . . the soldiers were killing, killing, killing ... 
people were killed. I know myself how the soldiers forced 
Timorese people whose house may have had a Fretilin flag, to 
come out of the house ; then all these people were killed by the 
soldiers . 
Did the former Bishop try to protest, and protect the people? 
At that time, it was absolutely impossible to do anything. All 
we could see were the soldiers, killing , killing, killing. No one 
dared to go and talk to the Indonesians. We had no idea what kind 
of people they were . The Timorese were just too afraid to do 
anything. 
I remember the first day when the Indonesian troops landed in 
Dili . Many Indonesian paratroops dropped from the sky. And as 
as they fell, pop ... pop . .. pop ... many were shot dead. The 
soldiers who landed started killing everyone they could find. 
There were many dead bodies in the streets. I was with the Bishop 
and some people came running to the house to tell us there were 
many wounded people . We decided to take them to hospital. But 
there were Indonesian soldiers in the streets. The hospital was 
about 5km away, and it was very dangerous to drive through the 
streets. When we went out and met some Indonesian soldiers, we 
showed by gestures that we wanted to take the wounded to 
hospital, so they replied: "Commandant, commandant" , pointing 
to where we should go to meet their commander. The Bishop and 
I went to the commandant to ask for permission to drive to the 
hospital. We took two young Timorese to he!~ us carry and look 
after the wounded. The commander (he could speak English), 
said that the Bishop and I could go to the hospital but the two 
young boys would have to stay behind. This made us very sad; 
these boys were afraid of what would happen to them when we 
left. But the commander refusetl to listen to our plea that the boys 
be allowed to go with us. We didn 't dare leave them there alone. 
So the Bishop said to me : "You go with the wounded" (I was 
driving the vehicle) "and I will stay here with the boys". I felt very 
afraid , driving alone like that, but I drove off, with some wounded 
people in the back of the car . 
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On the way, I met many Fretilin fighters. They knew me and 
asked me where I was goins. "To the hospital " I said. They told 
me to be careful because there were many people fighting. I drove 
as fast as I could, not stopping to look at anything. At the hospital , 
I asked the nurses to take the wounded people as quickly as 
possible , then drove straight back to where the commander was. 
He asked me what I had seen on the way. I told him there were 
Fretilin people everywhere and he should beware. 
The Bishop was still there , sitting and praying with his rosary, 
in a comer. By this time it was about 12 noon, and the Indonesian 
soldiers were taking out their lunch tins . So I said to the 
commander: "Your soldiers are eating lunch . We are hungry too, 
and we want to go home and have our lunch" . The commander 
replied "Okay, you and the Bishop can go home but the two boys 
must stay." 
When the boys heard this, they said: "Please, Father, don't 
leave us here . We are afraid they will kill us". And I was very 
afraid for them too . So I said to the commander: "We arrived as 
four people and there must be four of us when we go home. I 
refuse to leave two people here . If anyone is to be killed, it is 
better that we are all killed, all four of us . We two can't go home 
and leave the two boys here. We refuse to do that". · 
After a lot of talking, the commander finally agreed that we 
could all leave. We had been terribly afraid of what mighthapp<m. 
The streets were full of dead people, dead Timorese and dead 
Javanese . I had never seen a,nythillg like it .. Unbelievable. Death 
everywhere. I thought my own time hacl come too, but apparently 
it was not God's will , and I survived. 
How did the former Bishop of Dili, your predecessor, Bishop 
Ribeiro, cope? 
Oh, poor man, he could not cope at all. The whole situation 
was more than he could bear. All he did was cry---cry every time 
he heard about what the Indonesians were doing. He just cried 
and cried . Also, you must not forget, he is Portuguese, and it 
wounded his feelings very deeply to see the lndonesia.os pull down 
Portuguese flags and trample on everything Portuguese. So he 
asked the Vatican to allow him to resign. He retired in 1977. He is 
now living in Portugal and he is a very sick man. 
During the first years ofresistance, were you able to keep in contact 
with the fighting in the resistance? 
No, that was impossible. All of us in the towns were quite 
unable to leave , or to contact anyone. Of course, the priests who 
were in the ililterior, in the Catholic missions, went with the people 
into the bush. Then after two or three years, we asked the priests 
to come back from the bush . 
"Timorisation1" of the war 
What was the role of the Indonesian troops after the 
"Timorisation" of the war? 
Of course, they were still involved in the fighting. But they did 
not want to come face to face with the Fretilin soldiers, and they 
used the Timorese for this. They made it look as though Timorese 
were fighting Timorese. But Fretilin's response was: this is not a 
war between us, but a war between Indonesia and Timar. So when 
there were encounters, the Timorese troops did not fight each 
other. The troops in the two Timorese battalions did not fight 
Fretilin troops. So you see, although the Indonesians tried hard to 
cajole Timorese into fighting for them, giving them attractive 
things, money and so on, this was not successful. I know that many 
of the Timorese in the two battalions are very nationalist in·spirit 
and will not fight against Fretilin. 
So, Timorisation of the war started before the Operasi Keamanan 
of 1981? 
Yes, in 1979. The Timorese battalions were required to take 
part in the 1981 operation, but the main forces used were the 
civilian population, and at a terrible -cost. It was during this 
Operasi that I was taken to Baucau to have a discussion with 
General Jusuf, the Armed Forces Commander. He sent a 
helicopter to Dili to meet him in Baucau. I had made it clear 
repeatedly that I absolutely did not agree with this Operasi. I met 
General Jusuf, with General Dading Kalbuadi and General Ali 
Murtopo. I told them that, in waging such a huge operation as 
this , they should have considered the cost in terms of food , 
medicine , transportation . The operations involved enormous 
distances and many , many people. I told these generals that 
people were dying in the streets from lack of food, because they 
were so ;.veak. I also protested that even young boys from school 
had been forced to join the operations. I told them I was amazed 
such things had happened. He said he didn't believe it, but when 
he checked, he found that I was right. I told the generals that so 
much money must have been supplied for this operation, yet the 
people who were forced to take part were not being given any 
food; there was no medicine for them, no transportation. I was 
trying to hint that there had been a great deal of corruption, and 
Lord A vebury calls for arms 
embargo on Indonesia 
Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary · Human 
Rights Group in London, has called for an immediate 
arms embargo on Indonesia, in order to halt the Inda- · 
nesian offensive in East Timar. 
In a statement released to the press on 19 September, 
after returning from a visit to Portugal for discussions on 
the question of East Timar, Lord Avebury said: 
"Action must be taken without delay by the govern-
ments of western Europe and the USA to halt the 
massive new offensive launched in August by the Indo-
nesian military in East Timar. Western governments 
provide substantial military and economic assistance to 
Indonesia, and are therefore in a strong position to stop 
this new act of genocide inflicted on the long-suffering 
people of East Tim or. 
Refugees arriving in Lisbon last week told me of 
movements into the territory of Hercules aircraft every 
two or three days bringing in paratroops, armoured 
vehicles and other military material. They also saw the 
US-supplied OVlO Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft 
again operating, making frequent sorties towards the 
eastern part of the territory, where resistance is known 
to be at its strongest.This confirms reports from dip-
lomatic sources in Jakarta last month that Indonesia is 
deploying 20,000 troops in its cuirentoffensive against 
the people of East Timor. 
What we are going to do now is to call on the govern-
ments of the USA and western Europe to stop this 
aggression by declaring an arms embargo against Indo-
nesia. We also intend to appeal to the UN Secretary 
General to demand that Indonesia stops her military 
operations forthwith in order to allow him to continue 
his . consultations ' on the territory's right to self-
determination, in accordance with the Resolution of 
the General Assembly of November 1982. We will 
appeal, further, to the President of the Council of 
Ministers of the European Community to initiate aetion 
by the ten member states .to co-operate with the US in 
halting the flow of arms. : 
Whilst th.e civilised world rightly condemns the atrocity 
committed by the Soviet Union in shooting down an 
unarmed 'aircraft with the loss of 269 innocent lives, it 
ignores the murder of 200,000 Timorese and the re-
newed threat to their survival posed by Indonesian 
barbarism. We intend to do our best to make the voice 
of the Timorese community heard in the capitals of the 
West." 
19 September 1983 
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all at the expense of the Timorese people. I didn't say it directly 
but I think these generals understood what I was trying to say. 
1981 Operasi Keamanan, a total 
failure 
, 
Was Operasi Keamanan a success for Indonesia? 
No, not at all. On the contrary, it was counter-productive. 
They achieved nothing, absolutely nothing. It was counter-
productive because the Tiinorese who were involved in the so-
called fence-of-legs operations, ahead of Indonesian troops; 
warned Fretilin fighters of Indonesian plans, and helped them 
escape . And during the time of that Operation and since, Fretilin 
has continued tofight and get stronger. The Indonesians achieved 
nothing. . 
The operation also made the Timorese more anti-Indonesian 
than '.ever. So many people who came back from ·the operation 
were in a state of terrible physical exhaustion. They couldn't work 
on their fields and produce food. Because I could foresee what 
this would do to the level of food production, I sent a: letter in 
Novemper 1981 to the Australian Council of Bishops warning of 
what could happen. During the three months ofJuly; August and 
September, all the people, all males from .yoµng boys to men in 
their fifties, were away on these operations. They returned home 
weak and exhausted. As a result, the fields were not prepared for 
planting new crops which could seriously affett the .next harvest. 
The planting period is at the beginntng of November, but the 
fields have to be made readyweHbeforehand. Indeed there was a 
shortage of food in those years, in 1981and1982. · · 
What has been the effect of the Indonesian occupation on the level 
of food production? 
You know, if the Indonesians were to allow Timorese people 
to move around freely and live where they like, there would be no 
shortage of food. Of course, food production is influenced by such 
factors as the climate. But the problem is that people are forced to 
live in the settlements and are not allowed to travel outside more 
than five kilometres. If they go farther than that, they will almost 
". . . if people could live where they like, there would 
be no shortage of food . . . 
certainly be shot for trying to contact Fretilin. This is the main 
reason why people cannot grow enough food . 
When people discuss food in East Timor, they tend to consider only 
whether enough food aid is available. But surely that's not the 
point. Did the Timorese people suffer food shortages before 1975? 
No, they didn't. Of course, occasionally some natural disaster 
like a cyclone would damage the harvest, but generally speaking 
there was enough food for people's basic needs. I must say peopl~ 
in Timar tend not to work harder than they need .to satisfy their 
basic needs, but they didn't used ~o go short of food. 
What about the livestock and the agricultural implements people 
need? 
Buffaloes used to be very important to plough the soil for the 
cultivation of rice, but now almost no one has any buffaloes. Many 
buffaloes were killed in the war. In one place, a Catholic mission 
has some tractors, but this can only help a few people. 
Everywhere else, the work to prepare fields for rice-cultivation is 
back-breaking because there are no buffaloes. Even the few 
tractors often break down, and without technical means, people 
cannot repair them. In former days, most peasants had buffaloes, 
or could borrow them from their neighbours for a small fee. 
There is also a great shortage of agricultural tools, so people 
have to plough their fields with the help of a simple stick. That's 
very hard to do, very slow and it produces very low yields. 
Do the Indonesians interfere with religious practices in the 
settlements? 
No. Occasional incidents have been reported to me, but when I 
protested , the matter was corrected . As you know, in the 
Indonesian State everyone must have a religion so they let the 
Timorese practise their own religion. 
Have there been any attempts to replace Catholicism with other 
religions? 
Not really. There were some occasions , in the early period, 
when people used money and gifts to entice Timorese to convert 
to Islam. People were very hungry, so they took the money and 
adopted Islam. But after a while , when they had got enough food 
from this, they abandoried Islam and returned to their own 
religion. 
Revival of Fretilin 
Fretilin was severely hit in 1978. How did it manage to restore its 
fortunes after then? 
Yes, that is quite extraordinary. There was a period when 
Xanana completely disappeared. The guerrillas were very 
worried because they didn't know what had happened to him. 
But-well, I can't explain all the details-he was helped by some 
people to get away for a few months , which gave him time to s~udy 
and consider the situation very carefully . Then he came back, and 
began to reorganise. They all together carried ·out a very good 
reorganisation. In 1980, 198i and 1982 they became very strong . 
Xanana took over leadership of the resistance immediately after 
the destruction of the red bases and the killing of Nicolau Lobato . 
Before, Xanana was the deputy chief, and he became commander 
when Lobato was killed . He showed great skill in reorganising the 
resistance. It was a stunning blow when Fretilin launched their 
attack on an installation in Dili in June 1980. No one could 
imagine where they had got their renewed strength from . In those 
days, in 1980, 1981 , there were many rumours about secret 
meetings being organised by Fretilin. 
I must say I was deeply struck, reading the captured Army 
documents , to see how the Indonesians admit that Fretilin has 
been able to penetrate all the settlements, that they have bases 
and support groups absoiutely everywhere. Were you aware of 
this when you were in East Timor? 
Yes, I was . At first , I didn't notice anything; that was back in 
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1978. But then , little by little, we became aware that they were 
managing to penetrate everywhere, even right inside Dili. You 
can find Fretilin people in all the offices, even at the highest level. 
There they are, even inside the Indonesian armed forces . These 
are all clandestine of course. In his message to the Fretilin 
External Committee, Xanana said that when people look for 
Fretilin, they should realise that Fretilin is everywhere. Fretilin is 
the whole people . And I can tell you, that is absolutely true . 
Xanana said that the Indonesians go around asking where the 
Fretilin people are. The truth is that they are everywhere, the 
whole people are Fretilin . If the Indonesians want to kill off 
Fretilin, they will have to kill off the whole people. I am convinced 
of that. 
They are so well organised that the leadership is informed 
about evtrything. Anything that happens in Dili gets passed on to 
Xanana immediately. They know everything. 
Do you know anything about army personnel called "Babinsa"? 
They are mentioned very much in the Army documents. 
Yes, the babinsas are everywhere . They are the ones who have 
to know about everything happening in the villages and 
settlements. Everything has to be reported t~ them. But they 
don 't wear uniform and don't carry arms. If they need help, they 
call in patrols. These patrols are manned by Koramil troops. The 
babinsas are very important ; they are responsible for everything 
that happens in their area. The Koramil cover larger areas, so they 
aren't in all the settlements , but the babinsas are . 
You have lived under two colonialisms, Portuguese and 
Indonesia. Is there any comparison? How would you characterise 
the Indonesians as colonialists? 
I can only tell you what people say to me all the time: it was 
better living under the Portuguese colonialists than under this new 
Indonesian colonialism . There is a very great difference between 
them . There is not a spark of humanitarianism among the 
Indonesians . Perhaps the reason is that there are so many people 
in lndonesia___:about 150 million, isn't it?-so they simply don't 
value human life at all. The soldiers kill anyone without any sense 
". . . there is not a spark of humanitarianism among 
the Indonesians . .. " 
of guilt . If they are asked why they killed so-and-so, they say the 
person was related to a Fretilin member. Their officers then say 
that's okay. Killing people just doesn 't matter. 
Would you say the Indonesians treat Timorese in racist way? 
No, I don't explain it like that . They always adopt an attitude 
of superiority towards us and feel they can abuse our people any 
way they like . I have seen myself instances when Indonesian 
soldiers have abused someone, say, the relative of a Timorese 
soldier. When he learns abut this , the Timorese sold.ier becomes 
very angry and confronts the Indonesian . This scares the 
Indonesian who runs away, terrified of what will happen . So, you 
see, on the one hand, these Indonesians assume an air of 
superiority but at the same time they are deadly scared of the 
Timorese . Timorese people are fearless. Often, without arms , 
they can do nothing against an Indonesian who has wronged 
them, but they nurture their sense of outrage and one day they 
will surely take revenge. They treat you well if you behave 
properly, but if you abuse them, beware! The Indonesians treat 
the Timorese like a colonised people. They treat them not like 
men but like slaves . 
What has the church been able to do to protect people against 
abuses by the Indonesians? I know you yourself have done so 
much, but what about the other priests? 
Thee are many priests. in the country and they 'Possess a big 
influence among the people . Generally they are opposed to the 
oppression, so the Indonesian soldiers are afraid of them, because 
if people bring their complaints to the priests, the priests report 
them to the Bishop, so these complaints reach the officers. But 
sometimes, priests don't have-the strength to confront Koramil 
A Catholic church in E. Timor. A a centre for ·passive 
resistance? Photo: Rui Araujo. 
officers, so they wait for a chance to come to Dili and make the 
complaint to the Bishop, though often this is too late. 
How were you appointed to replace Bishop Ribeiro in 1977? 
The Pro Nuncio at the time, Mgr Ferrano, did it in a very 
proper way. He came to Dili, brought the priests together and 
offered them three names from which to choose their new leader. 
I was one of the three, and they chose me. 
Did the same thing happen when your successor, Mgr Ximenes 
Belo was appointed? 
No , that was under a new Pro Nuncio . He chose the new 
Apostolic Administrator himself, without any consultations at all. 
This made the priests in East Timor very angry, and they refused 
to attend the installation ceremony. 
How is he likely to cope? Do you think he will try to protect the 
Timorese against abuses, in the way you did? 
I don't know. He took up his new position' with no experience 
of how the Indonesians have treated our people . He was not there 
during the invasion; he returned to Timor quite recently so he 
knows very little. But I strongly believe that he will, little by little , 
realise what is going on, and begin to do what he can . He said 
recently-I saw a report in a Macau newspaper-that when he 
went back to Timor, he thought that the process of integration 
with Indonesia was complete , but after working there for a while , 
he now realises that this is not true. Also, I have heard that a while 
ago, some Catholic army chaplains from Indonesia asked him for 
permission to say Mass in various parts of the country. Before 
replying, he consulted the priests and they advised him to refuse, 
so that is what he did . That's a good sign . It would be quite wrong 
to allow army chaplains to say Mass, to preach, to go everywhere. 
They must stick to saying Mass for the soldiers and ke-ep away 
from the civilian population. 
What do you feel about the present situation in ET, with the new 
invasion and offensive? 
It is truly tragic. We must really do something to arouse public 
opinion about it throughout the world, to stop this offensive. 
Otherwise many, many people are going to be killed. We all know 
the effects of such a war , torture, massacre, arrests and all the 
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other tragedies. We all know this, so we have the moral 
obligation to do something to stop it. We should call upon the 
United Nations to do something quickly to stop it, otherwise there 
will be terrible abuse of human rights. The ones to .suffer will be 
the civilian population. 
How do you see this new offensive in terms of Indonesian policy? 
I think it proves that Indonesian efforts at annexation have 
failed completely. I think that privately they know they have 
made a terrible mistake in trying to annex Timar, but they will 
never admit this publicly. The people of Tim or simply refuse to be 
" ... we must do everything to arouse public opinion 
to stop this new offensive . . . " 
integrated. I have often said that if the people agreed with 
integration, I would go along with that, support it. But the 
converse is also true. If the people don't want to be integrated, if 
they want to be independent, we must do everything possible to 
help them. The Indonesians have made the terrible mistake of not 
being able to see this, and they are still making the same mistake. · 
So they have to use violence to impose their will. · It may be that 
with violence, they will achieve their objective, but it can only be 
temporarily, it cannot be a final victory. 
You know, we all believe in God. He cannot support such 
efforts by people to use brute force and violence to impose their · 
will on other people. It is my own feeling that people will pay in 
this world too for the wrongs they commit in this world. I am not 
against Indonesia, but I would like Indonesia to respect the right 
of the Timorese to be independent. They already have so many 
people and so many islands, more than 3,000. Why don't they 
look after all these other islands? Many of them are poor. 
Why do you think Indonesia wants to annex ET? 
It's a lot to do with egoism, wanting to prove how strong and 
superior they are. They have no sense of humility at all. With such 
terrible arrogance, they are blind to everything. They simply 
refuse to see that the era of imperialism is over. We can see this 
from history. We must not forget the lessons of history. The 
movement of history is towards independence. All people want to 
be independent. Indonesia must let the peole of Timar have their 
independence. 
What's your estimate of the number of Indonesian troops in ET? 
About 20,000. I have received reports about this. And this 
number is certain to increase. Earlier this year, before they 
started with the preparations for this new offensive, they had 
about four battalions of troops, about 4,000 men, not including 
Battalions 744 and 745. The Indonesians don't trust these 
battalions because the men in them are very nationalistic. 
Troop morale on the two sides 
Do you see any difference between the morale of the troops? 
Yes, very much so. The guerrillla troops are very different 
from the Indonesian soldiers. Why? Because they are fighting for 
an ideal, to achieve their own independence. So, whatever may 
happen to them, whatever sacrifice is required of them, theygo on 
fighting. But the Indonesian soldiers are people who b.ave been 
forced to come to Timar and fight. They haven't come there 
because they want to. And no one can say what they arefighting 
for. They have no morale. But Fretilin's morale is high, very, very 
high. When they shed blood, or think about dying for their cause, 
they are very proud because they feel it is better to die than to live 
without our independence. Because of this, they feel that they are 
strong enough to fight · anyone, absolutely · .. anyone. The 
Indonesians fight because they are mercenaries, but the Timorese 
fight because we want to fight, because it is.for the independence 
ofTimor. 
Have you found that some Indonesian troops are more ruthless 
than others? 
The experience of Indonesian troops is that in their first 
encounters on the battlefield, they are very ruthless, but little by 
little, they lose this. They get tired and fed up. Fighting in East 
Timar is very difficult for them. Sometimes they don't get 
enough food, they have to tramp in bad weather, cold, rain, with 
no transportation. And without any high morale, they very easily 
lose spirit altogethe_r. 
Do they have to rotate their troops very often? 
Yes. Some of the troops really don't want to fight, because 
they recognise the right of the Timorese people to independence. 
They can see no reason for the war. You know, there have been 
incidents when whole companies of Indonesian troops, including 
their officers, have refused to fight when face to face with Fretilin 
troops, have handed their weapons to Fretilin and withdrawn, 
Many Indonesian soldiers were punished and sent to Bali for 
court-martial. 
What do you know about the Kopassandha (RPKAD) troops? 
We were told they are very good soldiers, but even they run 
away when confronted with Fretilin troops. They are afraid, really 
afraid. Sometimes it's just enough for someone to shout, "Look 
out, Fretilin troops! Fretilin is coming!" for these troops to run 
away. 
But the Indonesian troops have better weapons, don't they? 
Yes, they do, but Fretilin has captured many of these weapons, 
including automatic weapons, from the RPK and other troops. 
These soldiers are afraid and they don't want to die. People often 
wonder how the resistance can survive . You should realise that 
they have many weapons as well. In the early days, they got their 
weapons from the old Portuguese colonial army, Mauzers, G3 
rifles and so on . But now they have newer, better weapons, 
automatics, machine-guns, ammunition-all captured from the 
Indonesians . 
Do you know whether Indonesia has used chemical weapons? · 
I don't know exactly. I have no experience in military 
technology, but I do know that sometimes when bombs were 
dropped, they emitted a stream of fire which burns everything in 
its path, all the vegetation. Perhaps these were napalm bombs. I 
have seen the effects, but I can't classify the weapons. 
Transmigration 
The Indonesians have started bringing transmigrants to East 
Timor. What do you know about this? 
In the beginning, I was informed by the military authorities 
about this. They said it would be good to bring some farmers from 
other parts to teach the Timorese about agricultural techniques. 
So, about 200 families were brought to Maliana from Bali . But 
they made a terrible mistake because they settled these families 
on land that belongs to Timorese who were driven off the land. 
The Timorese were very angry but, being powerless, they kept 
silent. They came and told me about it . They said they didn't mind 
if Balinese were brought there but they can't forgive the 
Indonesians for driving them off their land for the transmigrants. 
There is plenty of other land they could occupy. Why don't they 
go there, these people said to me. So I brought these complaints to 
the attention of the Indonesian authorities, and they decided to 
stop the transmigration for the time being. I had told them that if 
they didn't stop doing this kind of thmg, the Fretilin might force 
them to stop. 
Was the land given to the Balinese farmer/handed back to the 
Timorese? 
No it wasn't: And another problem is that these newcomers 
not only occupy the land of the Timorese. They also take over 
their jobs. These Balinese farmers are not familiar with the soil 
and didn't have much experieflce in agriculture so they have taken 
other jobs, house-building, carpenting and other crafts. 'They are 
favoured against the Timorese who have thus not only lost their 
land but have also lost various jobs they used to do. This has 
caused conflicts between the Indonesian peasants and the 
Timorese who have been thrust aside-the ones who have lost 
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their land as well as the ones who have lost work. 
I told the Korem officers in Dili that this is no good, either for 
the Timorese or for the Indonesians who come as transmigrants. 
This discrimination against Timorese is absolutely wrong. 
Opposition to Birth control 
programme 
Do you know anything about Indonesia's birth control 
programme? 
Yes , I know a great deal. Family planning is against the 
doctrine of the Catholic Church , so I myself, and the Catholic 
missionaries have all opposed it. Like other people in the East , 
the Timorese people very much like to have large families. This is 
even truer today, now that so many people have been killed since 
the war started. And besides this , many Timorese are Catholics . 
At the time they started with the family planning programme, I 
issued information about Catholic doctrine on the question of 
family planning, explaining what is allowed and what is forbidden. 
The result is that Jakarta's plans for family planning have not 
succeeded in East Timar. 
I know of many cases where women have been sterilised 
without their knowledge and consent. There have been cases 
when women , under operation for some · ailment, had their 
fallopian tubes closed without their knowledge . This is an act Of 
violence . Such things have also led to serious conflicts in the 
family. 
Have the authorities tried to use the contraceptive injection, Depo 
Provera? · 
Yes, indeed, very much, but with little success, at least in the 
- countryside, because Timorese villagers are in general suspicious 
of injections . So the contraceptive used most is the pill. The 
Indonesians have made a lot of propaganda about family 
planning , and send officials to people 's houses to convince them 
to use birth control. They hand out boxes of contraceptives, but 
after they have gone, the people give them to the priests! 
Do you know whether attempts have been made to use 
contraceptive injections on women against their will? 
This may have happened in some cases, but generally 
Timorese refuse injections. They are very suspicious of them. 
Until the time I left Dili , I think the Indonesians had made very 
little progress with their family planning programme . 
There has been a lot of critical publicity about Depo Provera and its 
use in third world countries; for instance the way it was used on 
Puerto Rican women to test its effectiveness, even though the drug 
is banned in the USA. Has this kind of thing happened in East 
Tim or? 
Not as far as I know . There are many polyclinics in Dili , and 
most of the nurses there are Catholic nuns, many of them 
Carrilelite sisters . These sisters are very conscious about this 
problem and they keep a close watch on the injections being 
administereCI. This is largely too because there is a num there who 
was in Puerto Rico and knows all about this problem. 
As for the women who were sterilised against their wish, I've 
had many of them come to me very upset indeed. Such things have 
led to serious rows in many families because the husbands want 
children but their wives have been sterilised. I · really doubt 
whether the family planning programme will succed , because the 
Timorese, the women as well as the men, want to have children . 
Sometimes, the officials say, if you have big families, the 
government will not give you any assistance, but the Timorese 
say: "Never mind! We don't need or want to rely on help from the 
government. In any case so many people have been killed since 
the invasion. We need more children, not less ." 
People have lost their sense of sin 
Why do you think the western governments have remained silent 
about the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor? 
I think the first reason is that these countries have strong trade 
links, huge investments in Indonesia . They are therefore afraid 
that if they criticise Indonesia, they will damage these interests 
and lose the profits they can make from them. It is also my 
impression that the people in power pursue strongly materialistic 
motives which override any idealism or morality about human 
rights although they speak about these things quite a lot. They are 
only concerned about the profits they can make, so they sacrifice 
principles for their materialistic motives . 
What I can observe is that many people in the west are losing 
their sense of sin . Nothing seems wrong any more to them, 
everything is allowed . And when people lose their sense of sin, 
they lose their sense of God. We need God because we are 
sinners. If people regard themselves as being super-human, they 
don't need God any more. That's a terrible thing. 
Wouldn't that be true as well for the Indonesian soldiers in East 
Timor? 
I don't see it like that. The soldiers do what they do because 
they are forced to , they are carrying out orders . But the 
authorities, the government of Indonesia, they are the ones who 
are responsible for the killing of many hundreds of thousands of 
people in Indonesia too, and the tens of thousands killed in East 
Timar. This is the sin of the government. 
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Junta • • • 
Colonel Wismoyo Arismunandar, Commander of the elite 
paratroop corps, Koppasandha. He is married to Mrs 
Suharto's younger sister, and introduced Prabowo to the 
Suhartos' daughter. 
General Benny Murdani, Commander of the Armed Forces. 
Now busy tryirig to annihi1ate re~is~ance in East Timor. 
President Suharto once said of Murdani: "Benny! If you listen · 
to Benny, you'll be in a war every day" (FEER, 21April,1983). 
Major Prabowo weds the daughter of General Suharto in 
Indonesia's "marriage of 1983". Prabowo, a Kopassandha 
(paratrooper), killed Nicolau Lobato, Fretilin's commander in 
1978, and is now "tipped as a a future army chief-of-staff'' 
(FEER, 15 September, 1983). Some say he is being groomed for 
President. But all agree he is the army's fastest rising star. He 
is now deputy commander uf Kopassandha's 8lst detachment 
(probably the detachment mentioned by Max Lane - see page 
19 - as being responsible for the death squad operations). 
and dynasty? 
Lieutenant-General Rudini, Army chief-of-staff. A well-known 
Murdani loyalist, he "has leapfrogged to the most senior posi-
tion in the army" writes FEER, 15 September, 1983. 
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Australian MP's report "tendentious, superficial and 
misleading'' says dissenting Senator Macintosh 
The Australian Parliamentary mission which visited East Timor 
at the end of July has drawn the conclusion that the need to 
"normalise" Australia's relations with Indonesia must take 
precedence over concern for the right of the people of East 
Timor to self-determination. It claimed that Indonesia "is 
making significant efforts to improve the physical and material 
conditions in East Timor" and that "Australians need a better 
understanding of the Indonesian position" . At the same time it 
spurned ·an opportunity to meet guerrilla leaders. 
Its report, which was made public in September by the 
mission's chairman, Bill Morrison who was Defence Minister 
when Gough Whitlam was Prime Minister, points out that the 
Indonesian government regards the Timor question as a critical 
test of Australian-Indonesian relations. "How Australia votes in 
the UN will . make no difference . . . a vote negating the 
Indonesian position would not alter the situation in East Tirrior. 
Such a vote would in fact diminish any role Australia could play 
in East Timor and Indonesia ." 
As for its concern with human rights abuse, the following . 
quotation shows how its criticism of abuses was quickly softened 
by impressions that the physical conditions of the victims were 
good: 
While the inhabitants are obviously being held there (in Atauro) 
against their will, the physical conditions under which they live are 
moderately comfortable and the people looked as w.ell fed and 
dressed as the villagers in the other areas visited . 
The only dissenting voice in the five-man delegation was that 
of Senator George Macintosh who refused to sign the report, 
which he described as "tendentious, superficial and at times 
misleading". He insisted that lack of time had meant the mission 
could form impressions, not soundly-based assessments. (The 
Australian, 7 September, 1983.) 
Opportunity of an encounter with guerrilla leaders is lost 
The mission's chairman in fact had a direct encounter with four 
Fretilin guerrillas who, at enormous risk, intercepted the 
mission's convoy on the road leading west to Baucau. The 
interception occurred after most of the convoy had passed, so 
only Bill Morrison actually met the guerrillas. His discussion 
with them was severely hampered by interpretations which failed 
to convey what the guerrillas were saying. The distortions were 
exposed by an Australian Broadcasting Commission journalist, 
John Lombard, who managed to tape most of the conversation 
which was later transcribed. When the transcription . was 
publicised on an ABC programme, there was widespread 
criticism in the media of the translation services provided to the 
mission. The exposure seriously discredited many of the findings 
of the mission. · 
The guerrilla spokesman who held a discussion with Morrison 
was Cancio da Sousa Gama. He gave Morrison a letter and 
informed the mission that guerrilla leaders had moved into a 
concentration camp (the term Fretilin uses for the strategic 
settlement . camps set up throughout East Timor) nearby, in 
Saelari, in the hope of having a meeting wih the mission. 
Morrison was offered the chance of going there to have a 
discussion, but Gama's explanation of Fretilin's position in 
Saeleri was grossly distorted. Obviously confused, Morrison only 
APPEAL FROM ATAUft~ ..... 
THIS IS AN APPEAL TO OUR BROTHER PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA WHO PLEDGE THEffi SOLIDARIT¥ WITH 
EAST TIMOR WHO ARE SUFFERING THE INJUSTICE OF A WAR CAUSED BY THE COLONIAL IMP}!: 
DURING THE LAST EIGHT YEARS. WE EXPRESS OUR FEELINGS OF GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE OE 
ARE REPRESENTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION NOW VISITING ).'IMOR. 
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told the guerrillas that he would first have to talk about this with 
the governor of East Tim or, Mario Carrascalao. The mission 
made no further effort to link up with the guerrillas in Saelari, 
and one wonders what happened as soon as the Indonesian 
authorities learned of the presence of important guerrilla leaders 
at the camp . 
Distorted "inUrpretations" 
The following are some examples of the distorted way Gama's 
words were interpreted (the interpretations went through 
Indonesian and Portuguese): 
Morrison: .. .I am interested to know how many men are in the 
camp. 
Gama (properly interpreted): The camp is a concentration camp 
made by the Javanese. We came there two months ago waiting 
for you, senhors . . . 
Indonesian translator: They are already there two months to 
wait for the delegation. 
Morrison: ... How many men are there? Just these four? 
Gama (properly interpreted): In conjunction with all the 
population under the control of the Indonesian forces and we 
who came from the bush, we are more or less 40 elements, 
women and men. We are guerrillas from the bush. 
Indonesian translator: They are altogether with the people, with 
the Indonesian people, the local people, they could not count 
this, but onl~ that they were in all 40 people, including their 
wives. 
Morrison: But you realise most parts of East Timor, that foe 
Fretilin does not occupy a strong position. That your position is 
very we'ak. Why do you think you can win? 
Gama (properly translated): All the people, during three years, 
have been the basis of our support. All the people of East Timor 
are decided, even those in villages controlled by Indonesian 
forces, are all decided to defend their ideal , which is total 
independence. 
Indonesian translator: They told that all the people. are now 
under their control and including the people of Laga are under 
their control. 
Later, the conversation continued: 
Morrison: We will take the letter and have the letter translated. 
If we wanted to get back in touch with you ... how would we get 
in contact with you? 
Gama: We here are four and there are four more elements in 
the village, and we all wa~t to take the delegation to Saelari to 
contact our leader who is at the moment in Saelari. 
Indonesian translator: They do not want to answer the question; 
but if you want to meet them .. . they are here four people and 
the other four are in Laga . .. and you come to Laga. They 'want 
to bring to Saelari to discuss with their leader. 
Morrison: Well, we ' ll le.ave this tonight. It is already getting 
dark. And I will discuss it with governor Carrascalao, and 
somehow we'll get a message to you if we decide to come . .. 
Gama: When you arrive in the village of Laga, talk to the 
leaders of the forces who are there, not to do any harm to us 
because we are here under the control of therri . .. becausd 
~re~y. . . , 
Indonesian translator (interrupting): In fact he is afraid 
. . . Don't talk with the authorities in Laga because he is under 
the control of the authorisation in Laga. ·. · ' 
Morrison: But we . . . hear, say ... but what, who is under 
control, who ... ? You said you had control of Laga. · 
And so the distortions continued! Yet when Bill Morrison 
was later confronted with these distortions on the basis ofthe 
ABC's full transcription, he actually came to the defence of the 
interpreters, saying they ha,d complained about the quality of 
Gama's Portuguese! 
Life in Fretilin-controlled areas of East Timor. 
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"If people could live where the 
' . 
shortage in 
In July this year , just a few days before the visit to East Timar of the Australian Parliamentary mission, Fretilin sent out a detailed 40-
page report on human rights abusf! and on social and economic conditions in the many strategic settlements scattered throughout the 
country. The first part, on human rights, gives information about several hundred individuals (see box); two lists of disappeared pers~ns 
are attached . One of the lists is the same as the list handed over secretly to Senator Gordon Mcintosh, a member of the Australian 
Parliamentary mission, by a prisoner on Atauro island . 
We publish below a shortened version of the part on social and economic conditions . For the first time, living conditions in many 
different camps have been revealed. The strategic settlements (known in Indonesian Army terminology as "daerah pemukiman" or 
settlement areas) are referred to throughout the report as "concentration camps" . The term is being used in its original meaning, when 
the term was first coined for the tightly-controlled concentrations of populations set up by the British Army under Lord Kitchener during 
the Boer War. The term is clearly not intended to invoke the more recent form of concentration camps created in Germ.any under Hitler. 
Each section of the report, which is written in Portuguese and is mostly in hand-writing, is signed by Xanana, commander of the 
Revolutionary Council of National Resistance, and is dated 25 July, 1983. 
Railaco, to the south west of Dili 
. . . hunger is severe. On 6 May this year, several columns of 
guerrillas passed through Faeisi, a district in Railaco; when they 
checked the huts, they found only enough dried manioc to last 
three months. The economic conditions are far worse than they 
were in 1976-1978, at the height of the military operations . 
There are no medical services for the people and parents are 
preventing their children from learning Indonesian. 
******* 
Likor/Laclo 
. . . this is a concentration camp on the bank of the river Lado 
(east of Dili). Half the people here are suffering from illnesses 
and are in a physically weak state because of malnutrition . 
People lack decen~ clothing, their huts are often flooded .. . The 
region used to produce rice but today this is impossible. 
******* 
Bazartete 
. . . here people grow betel, copra and coffee which helps 
them stave off hunger. But in March this year, truces were 
imposed on these products for the first time, and people are also 
required to contribute one-third of their output to finance the 
Army's mopping-up operations. Only those who pay bribes to 
the Indonesian troops are permitted to take their coffee to Dili 
to sell it there. 
******* 
Hatu Builico 
... is a concentration camp on the road from Aimara to Aile'. 
Situated in the Ramelau mountains, a crop of corn takes several 
months to grow. There is a severe lack of food, and during the 
periods of food shortage, the people go searching for wild plants. 
Everyone, including the women and children, are required to do 
forced labour. The huts with zinc roofs are occupied by Timorese 
who work for the colonial officials or members of hansip, but 
these huts have very thin walls . The huts where the rest of the 
people live are even worse, with roofs of straw or even just 
leaves. 
******* 
Same: town and surrounding camps 
.. . the only ones who still own some property and cattle are 
the civil servants, camats, bupatis, policemen, school directors 
and traditional chieftains. Most people have only manioc and 
potatoes to eat. This is a cold, hilly region where corn grows 
slowly; any corn grown is sold to get cash to buy essential needs. 
During the hunger crisis months, December to February, the 
people live from wild plants. At times of intensive agricultural 
activity (soil preparation, weeding and sowing) people are 
required to work on the land of the colonial authorities for 
nothing. It is called gotong-royong . .. Strict control over the 
movement of the population and official decisions about which 
land may be cultivated- determined according to the needs of 




. .. is a concentration camp near the south coast about lOkms 
from the town of Same. The soil here is good but the people have 
only primitive agricultural implements with the result that output 
is very low. The only livestock available belong to the 
· landowners; if people want to borrow these to help till the land 
to grow rice, they must pay for it with their own labour. During 
the hunger-crisis months, people are required to do forced 
labour. Throughout the year, they are required to do one or two 
days forced labour each week. During periods of intensive 
agricultural activity, they sometimes have to work one or two 
weeks at a stretch ... 
******* 
Alas 
... situated about Skms to the east of Same. Although two 
crops of corn can be grown here annually' conditions for the 
people are very poor because of the prevalence of mosquitoes 
and disease for which no medical services are available. The 
physical conditions of the people keep corn production very low. 
Go into any hut and you will, see that the people live mainly on 
sagu and an edible root, uhitrik, which they gather in the forests. 
In We-susu, Skms south of 'Alas, conditions are better 
because people can grow more corn and c~ssava: .Yet here too 
there are periods of hunger when the people have to rely only on 
sagu. 
******* 
Mana tu to 
. .. is on the north coast, east of Dili. The chief occupation of 
the population is growing rice, but output is far below pre-war 
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r liked, there would be no food 
~ t T. '' as ImOr formerBishopofnm 
because of the absence of livestock-most have been taken by 
the Indonesians-and also because of the greatly reduced area 
allowed for production as a result of the policies of the 
occupation forces. Some people can eke a living from fishing . 
Producing salt is a traditional activity in this region but the areas 




. .. is the location of a camp, 2kms south of Manatuto . Corn 
production here is better than elsewhere , · but even so people 
produce only enough for 3 or 4 months; for the rest of the year 
they must depeJ?.d on gathering wild plants, leaves and roots. 
Most people live in straw huts. Hciuses with zinc roofs h·ave been 
built to impress outsiders, because · they can be seen from 
helicopters . . . 
******* 
Laleia 
.. . on the road to Baucau, 22kms east of Manatuto. 
Conditions here are far ·worse than in Manatuto ... every hut is 
a centre of poverty and hunger. People produce corn and rice 
but output is very low because of the lack of buffaloes . Things 
here have sharply deteriorated since "integration" which (the 
journalist) John Hamilton has labelled "a success story" . The 
population is now concentrated around the town; and large areas 
formerly used for food production such as Santo , Nan Rain, 
Rotuna, Segat, We Tiran, We Morem, Seram Baek, Kok Hoio, 
Samblai, Tissak Um, Beko, Lian Aen and Todos have all been 
abandoned. 
. . 
People work only with very primitive implements, which is all 
EAST TIMOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS 
they Iiow have. Even the privileged families , associated with the 
colonial administration , are badly off. People are in a constant 
state of hunger. Because of the severe lack of food , all nearby 
sources of sagu have been used up, people must go farther afield 
to find it. 
******* 
Laklubar 
... about 34 kms into the interior from Manatuto, 
approaching the central mountainous region. Conditions here 
are extremely bad and people live mainly from the wine of palm 
trees and from potatoes or cassava. Because of the soil and 
climate, corn takes about 9 months to ripen and families can only 
produce 3 to 4 tins a year (1 tin = about 15 kgs). Starvation is 
therefore with the people all the year round. 
******* 
Lacio 
... about 20kms south west of Manatuto . Here people can 
produce rice and corn, but they also gather sagu to supplement 
this. The yield of corn is better here th_an in Manatuto, and 
people can sell some of their produce so as to have cash for other 
needs. But' many production areas had to be abandoned when 
the people were forced into the concentration camps . These 
abandoned regions were well-organised rice production areas in 
Portuguese colonial days. 
******* 
Tutuala 
... is in the most eastern tip of East Timar. Famine here is 
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areas . Areas to the south like Aleira Lafal were rice-producing 
regions but they are now under guerrilla control. People live 
mainly from cassava, a little fishing and a very small output of 
com . The colonial administration has .set up a "co-operative" run 
by the camat and the Koramil officer ; this is just a device for 
extracting taxes from the population . Death from starvation is a 
frequent occurrence here . 
Maeran, and camps on the road from Poro to Assalaino 
... Production areas are restricted to only between 200 and 
500 metres from the camp boundaries because of security 
considerations so there is little food to fend off starvation.::._ 
several pre-wa~ productive regi~ns . are now abandoned . Output 
is very low ·because of this and also because people don' t have 
any livestock . 
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This diagram, from the secret Army documents captured in 1982 by Fretilin, illustrates an instruction that people's ·gardens must be 
located close to the resettlement area. The lefthand example is "wrong", the righthand example is "right". 
- From Titilari to Los Palos 
. .. conditions for the population who surrendered at the end 
of 1978 are far ~'orse than for those who surrendered earlier . 
Security ~estrictions on .their prod~ction ~r,~as are much .tighter. 
People here are in a very we.ak physical state, and are constantly 
hungry' so they have no energy to cultivat.e the soil properly or 
to go gathering edible roots and leaves :·on occasion, people 
have been ordered to evacuate their homes for security reasons. 
This has happened mainly round Los Palos, when people have 
been forced out of their homes by armed troops and their huts 
then destroyed . When this happened they had to live under the 
trees for some time before new huts were built. People live 
almost entirely from wild roots and coconuts ; the death rate 
from starvation is high . 
******* 
Muapitine 
. . . people from here were transferred to Vailoro in mid-
1982. Their only source of food in the new place is leaves and 
roots. Stavation is very serious . 
******* 
Camps on the road from Ililopa to Lore 
. .. People here did not surrender till the end of 1978, so .their 
conditions are particularly bad and they suffer from very serious 
restrictions in the land available for food production. They too 
must rely on coconuts and wild roots . Many die of starvation. 
******* 
Camps on the road Laga-Saelari-Atelari _ 
Apart from some fields along the coast belonging to people 
who gave themselves up in 1976, the whole road to Atelari is 
inhabited by people who surrendered in 1979. In pre-war days 
and in the years from 1976-1978 , rice production was plentiful 
around Laga , and corn and cassava were only grown to 
supplement this . Now, because of · the very limited land 
available, people must search for wild r.oots to survive. About 
70% of the productive areas is under guerrilla control. Disease 
and death from starvation are widespread. 
Baguia 
Although this is a show place with plenty of houses with zinc 
roofs, the people in fact live in conditions of starvation and 
disease . This is in fact one of the worst areas because of the lack 
of land for food production and the tight security control. The 
death rate is high. 
******* 
Uatokarabau 
For. those who surrendered in ' 1977, conditions are quite good 
because they can till land ·near the coast. The majority who 
surrendered in late 1978 are subject to far greater secdurity 
control. They possess very few animals , have little land to till and 
suffer severe starvation from December to March every year. 
, ,··.-,-, ··-...: 
******* 
Uatolari 
. Formerly this was an important rice-growing region; but today 
vast tracts of land have been abandoned. People don't have 
proper implements to till the land, only iron rods which make the 
work extremely hard and unproductive . Because corn and 
cassava output is so low, people gather edible roots and leaves . 
Many people are no more than skin and bone . The children and 
the elderly in particular display signs of advanced malnutrition 
and physical weakness. Many are ill, but medical facilities don't 
exist, excepqoi_ those who can pay. Things are so bad today that 
it is certairVmany people will die of starvation. Considering that 
Ua:tolari used to be such an important rice-producing area, the 
claims of Mario Carrascalao, repeated by John Hamilton, that 
rice production in.East Timor would reach 65 ,000 tons this year 
are patently absurd . The entire rice-producing area from 




There is a sharp contrast between the large number of people 
settled here and the very limited area of land available for food 
production . _Recently, corn production has been resumed whic)l 
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has improved things, but even so, the output is not enough for 
more than about 3 months. If it had not been for the ceasefire 
this year which made more food production possible, about a 
thousand people would certainly have died of starvation. Most 
people are physically very weak, especially the young and the 
elderly. Huts with zinc roofs are visible from helicopters. They . 
were built in May 1982 and until recently only Indonesian .troops . 
lived there. During the ceasefire some local people were allowed 
to live in these huts which had really been built only for 
propaganda purposes. 
Forced labour widespread in 
Timorese resettlement camps 
The practice of forced labour is now widespread in the 
resettlement camps which were set up in East Timor in the late 
1970s as part of Indonesia's war strategy to isolate the resistance 
movement. Timorese people are being required to work without 
pay on land owned by Indonesian officials as well as on the land 
of more privileged Timorese (village and district heads, civil 
guard and Battalion 745 commanders). They also have to work 
on road construction, building houses and offices for the 
occupying forces, and to carry out timber-logging and cut down 
bamboo. In one area, people are required to work without pay 
on a state-owned sugar plantation in Ue Tice. Generally 
speaking, people are required to perform forced labour one day 
a week but this is often extended as the "need" arises . 
This information is contained in a detailed report drawn up by 
Fretilin in July this year. 
Food production critically low 
In virtually all the camps, the level of food production is 
extremely low. Few peasants are producing rice any more and 
most families are not able to produce more than about 5 or 6 tins 
of corn (a tin contains about 15 kilos) a year. In some places, 
production is down to only 2 or 3 tins a year . Besides the 
imposition of forced labour, low production levels are the result 
of the very limited amount of land available to the camp 
inhabitants, whilst at the same time, vast tracts of productive 
corn- and rice-producing land have been completely abandoned 
because of the enforced resettlement of the peasants . Fretilin 
reports that fertile areas that have been abandoned include the 
upper reaches of the river Vemasse, and a stretch of country 
extending 30 kilometres westward from the town of Laleia and 
southwards to Bibileu, including the fertile upper valley of the 
river Laleia . Further south, no fewer than 14 villages and regions 
to the west of Ossu and Viqueque have been abandoned, and 
further north, another 18 food production regions are now going 
to waste. 
Efforts to produce food on the land made available to camp 
inhabitants are severely hampered by the lack of agricultural 
implements and livestock. Few families now possess any 
buffaloes, except for the more wealthy, privileged Timorese 
families. Most implements are virtually beyond repair, yet 
people simply cannot earn the cash they would need to purchase 
new ones. 
Crops burnt in advance of military operations 
In early 1981, people living in the camps were suddenly ordered 
to gather in all their corn by April, regardless of the fact that it 
was not yet ripe. Nor was the time allowed anywhere near 
enough to complete the back-breaking task. Everything left 
standing in the fields after the time limit had passed was burnt, 
causing a 30% loss of crops. This was the time when preparations 
were under way for Indonesia's 1981 offensive, Operasi 
Keamanan. This year again, a similar order went out, requiring 
all corn to be gathered in before August, and warning people 
that anything left standing will be burnt. Once again, this 
destruction of crops can only be ·explained against the 
background of the preparations for the military offensive which 
was launched in August this year. 
Fretilin 's report about conditions in the camps is the first of its 
kind to be received from East Timor. It is an important record of 
the factors underlying East Timor's appalling food problem. The 
resettlement camps themselves are central to the problem, and 
as long as they remain in existence, famine will continue to 
threaten the people of East Timor. 
Human rights abuses in 
East Timor 1 
The Fretilin report on human rights abuse gives details of 
war crimes that have been committed by Indonesian 
troops since 1975 . They include mass executions and 
regular cases of torture, including castration , people being 
burnt alive and cannibalism. 
It is introduced as a report "to assist Amnesty Inter-
national and human rights organisations" and documents 
in meticulous detail cases of execution , torture and dis-
appearances involving about 280 people . Many of the 
names given are already on Amnesty International lists, 
and involve cases for which the organisation has been 
seeking more details . 
It relates for the first time the fate of many Fretilin 
leaders who have disappeared since the invasion of 1975. 
For example, it mentions that the former left-wing leader , 
Antonio Carvarino, was captured in February 1979 and 
was burnt alive after being tortured . It also describe mass 
executions in the Matabean and Los Palos regions, giving 
names and dates, and provides details of some particularly 
savage cases of torture . 
For instance, on 29 August, 1982, a guerrilla named 
Alberto had been captured near Dare , outside Dili, and 
taken to a resettlement camp. Military commanders 
ordered his death and, according to the report, "his body 
was butchered like an animal" and an "official ate his flesh 
in front of the assembled population , saying, 'This is what 
we do to Fretilin ' " . Details are also given of a case in Sep-
tember 1978 when two Fretilin local organijers were cap-
tured, tied down , castrated and otherwise tortured , then 
left to die in the sun. 
From a report by Jill Jolliffe , in the Canberra Times, 
4 September 1983. 
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Amnesty exposes Indonesian 
brutaliti,es ·in Erist Timor 
A representative of Amnesty International submitted testimony to the UN Decolonisation Committee in August about Indonesian 
atrocities and human rights violations in East Timor. The following are extracts taken from the submis_sion. (The full document-ASA 21/ 
09/83-is available from Amnesty head office: 10 Southampton Street, London WC2E 7HF.) 
Violations of human rights in East Timor have occurred in a 
context in which the right to freedom of expression does not 
exist. People expressing that right have been detained and ill-
treated. 1 Movement and communication within and beyond East 
Timor have been tightly controlled . Amnesty International 
further . understands that East Timorese recently permitted to 
leave the territory to be reunited with theii: families abroad have 
been warned routinely by Indonesian intelligence officers before 
leaving not to . reveal information which might discredit the 
Indonesian occupation and have been threatened with reprisals 
against themselves and members of their family still in .East 
Timor if they do so . 
******* 
Interrogation and Torture 
Amnesty International has received many reports of torture of 
East Timorese suspected of having opposed the Indonesian 
occupation . A Timorese who had worked with Indonesian 
intelligence has described the procedure in these circumstances: 
The normal procedure was to interrogate the captives or those who 
surrendered. People who surrendered and were rot soldiers who had 
engaged in battle with Fretilin would be permitted to go free after the 
interrogation but only after approval from intelligence headquarters 
in Dili. 
During the interrogations they were normally tortured , especially 
if the interrogators thought they were Fretilin soldiers or leaders. 
They would be tortured by hitting them with a blunt instrument, by 
jabbing lit cigarettes into their faces around the mouth, or by giving 
them electric shocks ,sometimes on the genitals. _ 
The senior authorities would decide who was to be killed after 
interrogation. Most ofthe leaders or more educated ones , ·those who 
were talented , were killed . Their wives would also be interrogated, 
tortured and killed. 
******* 
Amnesty International would particularly like to draw 
attention to two interrogation houses reported to be in current 
use in Dili as of the beginning of 1983. There have been 
persistent reports of the torture and ill-treatment of persons held 
in these places. They are: 
- a warehouse attached to the house formerly owned by 
Francisco Babo in the Rua Abilio Monteira in the Colmera 
district, now believed to be occupied by a unit of the RPKAD 
(Resimen Parakommando Angkatan Darat , paratroops), 
recently renamed Kopassandha; 
1. These include the cases of: 
- three people, at one time associated with the "integrationist" Uniao 
Democratica Timorense (UDT) , who were arrested and beaten i_n July 
1980 reportedly for having aired criticisms of the Indonesian occupation 
on the Tetum~language program of Radio Republik Indonesia , Manil-
kokorek; 
- two members of the Indonesian appointed Regional people 's 
Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah , DPRD) arrested in 
November 1981 after they had written to President Suharto in June 1981 
alleging serious misconduct by Indoneseian officials and military 
personnel including the killing of non-combatant East Timorese; 
- persons who had communicated with visiting delegations and 
television crews being subsequently taken in for questioning 
- a house formerly owned by Joao do Rosario Martires in 
the Rua Alferes Duarte 0 Arbiru in the Faro! district used 
since late 1979 for interrogation by army intelligence (A-I, 
commonly known as Intel). 
Amnesty International has reports of persons taken to these · 
interrogation houses . who emerged bearing visible signs of 
torture. One such account referring to the Intel house reads: 
One of my Fretilin friends was tortured with electric shocks and 
burning in December 1980. After the shock treatment his lips were 
burnt and broken as they had attached the wire to his lips. His body 
had also · been extensively burnt with cigarettes. He was tortured 
because he was suspected of passing information to the Fretilin 
forces . 
Among those held for interrogation and allegedly tortured 
were a number of women, some of whom had reportedly been 
picked up on suspicion of having communicated with relatives in 
the bush. Amnesty International has the names .of several 
women held by intelligence who were reportedly raped and had 
burning cigarettes applied to their breasts . 
An account of the RPKAD house in the Rua Abilio Monteiro 
attests to its fearsome reputation: 
If you go there, things are 99.9% hopeless. Those sent there had been 
caught in the mountains fighting against Indonesian troops, especially 
the bush commanders. They are tortured for information with 
cigarettes to the cheeks, breasts, ears, genitals and with electric 
shocks. Then they are killed. 
Amnesty International also has the names of people who 
were held in either of the two above-mentioned houses who . 
"disappeared" and are feared dead. 
An informant who had access in rnid-1982 to the warehouse 
behind the RPKAD house where prisoners were held, reported 
seeing about 100 people there whom the informant judged from 
their appearance and dress to be predominantly village people 
from outside Dili. Amnesty International does not know the 
present situation of these people. However, there are grounds 
for concern for their safety in view of other reports indicating 
that people understood to have been taken to one or other of the 
interrogation houses in Dili .have not reappeared. 
One such case involves Venancio Gomes, a member of the 
Fretilin Central Committee, who was arrested in Dili in the first 
days of the Indonesian invasion in December 1975. Those 
arrested at this time who escaped immediate execution were first 
transferred to the Tropical Hotel and then moved to the 
Portuguese District Prison (the Cadeia Comarca, which is still 
known as the Comarca despite being renamed Lembaga 
Pemasyarakatan Dili by the Indonesians) in January 1976. 
Venancio Gomes was released from the Comarca in 1979. 
Following the Fretilin attack on a broadcasting station in Dare 
on the outskirts of Dili on 10 June 1980, Venancio Gomes was 
one of about 600 people reportedly arrested in Dili. He was 
initially held in the Comarca but after a week was taken to the · 
Intel house in Faro!. He never reappeared. 
Amnesty International has received reports of persons dying 
as a result of torture and beating suffered during interrogation 
and this may also have been the fate of others who are reported 
to have "disappeared". Orlando Marques, whom the 
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Indonesians had appointed camat (sub-district officer) of 
Iliomar, Los Palos, reportedly died as a result of blows received 
during interrogation after being picked up on suspicion of 
disaffection shortly after returning from an administrators' 
course on Java. Afonso Freitas who had surrendered in late 1978 
reportedly died in his house in Vemasse in 1979 as a result of 
blows received while detained in the pousada (inn) in Baucau. 
Amnesty International has the names of 14 persons who 
reportedly died as a result of torture and starvation in prisons in 
Dili and Aileu following the Fretilin attack of 10 June 1980. 
******* 
Extrajudicial Executions and "Disappearances" 
There is now a large body of evidence indicating that Indonesian 
forces in East Timor have resorted to extra judicial executions on 
a large scale since the very first days of the invasion. Amnesty 
International now has lists of hundreds of people who were 
reportedly killed outside combat, or "disappeared" betwee.n 
December 1975 and the end of 1982. Amnesty International's 
own investigations have concentrated on the period from early 
1979 and have revealed recurring patterns of large~scale killings 
and "disappearances" as well as cases of what appear to be 
random killings of individuals and small groups. 
Amnesty International believes that it is now firmly 
established that several hundred East Timorese were executed 
throughout the territory between late 1978 and September 1979. 
Some were killed immediately following surrender or capture, 
others some time after. Others still were people suspected of 
associating with Fretilin but who had not themselves joined 
Fretilin in the bush. An analysis attached to one list of 51 names 
of persons killed in the eastern part of the territory during these 
months states that the people on the list had held positions of 
second and third rank in Fretilin and that some were people in 
civilian occupations who had never participated in the fighting. 
Amnesty International's own investigation of these killings 
suggests that the worst affected areas were in the eastern part of 
the territory and in partiq1lar the district of Los Palos and the 
towns and villages in the · vicinity of Mount Matebian. In the 
course of one operation in the vicinity of Mount Matebian 
between 15 and 17 April 1979, 118 people not engaged in combat 
were reportedly executed in Uatolari, Uatocarabau, Viqueque, 
Ossu, Baguia and hamlets on the southern slopes of the 
mountain. Amnesty International has the na~es of 31 people 
reportedly executed in Kelikai in May-June 1979. A report on 
the situation in this period states: 
When they want to liquidate someone, they say that they have gone 
to continue their studies or that they have left for Jakarta or Lisbon, 
or that they were called urgently to · Kelikai. Kelikai is an 
administrative post at the foot of Mount Matebian where they have 
carried out many murders. To speak of Kelikai makes our heart beat 
and our hair stand on end, for Kelikai means certain death for those 
called there. 
Amnesty International has the names of 82 persons who 
reportedly "disappeared" or were executed in the Los Palos 
district in 1979. Amnesty International also has the names of 
persons who were reportedly killed or "disappeared" in parts of 
the territory other than the eastern region, including the districts 
of Aileu and Same and in the capital, Dili. 
******* 
Several surrendered and captured Fretilin leaders 
"disappeared" in Dili and elsewhere at this time. Among them 
were several persons who had been members of the Central 
Committee of Fretilin and persons who had been appointed 
ministers when the Democratic Republic of East Tim or had been 
proclaimed on 27 November 1975 including: the Minister of 
Education and Culture, Hamis Basarewan Bin Umar; the 
Minister of Justice., Antonio Duarte Cavarino; the Minister of 
Finance, Juvenal Maria de Fatima Inacio; the Vice-Minister of 
National Defence, Hermenegildo Alves; the Vice-Minister for 
Communications and Tr.-.c1sport, Domingos de Costa Ribeiro; 
and the Central Committee members, Maria do Ceu Pereira 
Cavarino, Dulce Maria da Cruz, Sebastiao Montalvao, Alfonso 
Redentor de Araujo and Leopoldo Joaquim. 
Leopoldo Joaquim, a member of the Fretilin Central 
Committee, surrendered in Same in the southwest of the 
territory in early 1978. The event was considered sufficiently 
important by the Indonesian authorities for them to draw up a 
propaganda leaflet bearing his photograph and announcing his 
surrender. He was detained for several months after his 
surrender in the San Tai Ho warehouse. In April 1979 some time 
after his release, he was taken by Indonesian troops from his 
house and escorted to the home of his 17-ye&r-old niece, Maria 
Gorete Joaquim. Maria Gorete Joaquim had been detained in 
1976 as a member of the Fretilin student organisation, 
UNETIM. Both were then taken away, purportedly to work in 
Baucau. Neither has been seen or traced since. Various 
unconfirmed reports of their execution have reached Amnesty 
International. 
Several of those who "disappeared" from Dili were being 
held in prison at the time of their "disappearance". Among them 
was the Fretilin armed forces commander, Domingos da Costa 
Ribeiro, who had reportedly been captured and brought to Dili 
in 1977. He and ten other prisoners held in the Comarco were 
reportedly taken on the night of 18 April 1979 from the prison to 
a beach in the east of Dili called Areia Branca and executed by 
members of Battalion 745, a Timorese unit commanded by 
Indonesians. In this group of prisoners were also Filomeno Alves 
and Manecas Exposto, known in Dili before the invasion as 
members of a popular musical group, the Cinco do Oriente, both 
of whom had surrendered in Maubisse in January 1979. Two 
other prisoners held in the Comarca, Joao de Conceicao, 
formerly an official in the Public Works Department under the 
Portuguese, and Joao Bosco Sarmento Quintao, formerly a 
military policeman in the Portuguese army. Both were taken by 
troops of the RPKAD one night in March 1979 and never 
reappeared. Amnesty International has received reports that 
these two prisoners were killed at Lake Tacitolu, west of Dili. 
Amnesty International has received frequent reports of persons 
being taken to Areia Branca and Lake Tacitolu to be killed. 
******* 
Amnesty International continues to receive reports such as 
the following : 
- In November 1982, four persons, Jose Viegas, Augusto 
Bello, Augusto Gusmao and Cosmo Freitas were picked up by 
Indonesian troops in Vemasse, Baucau on suspicion of having 
relations with Fretilin. Jose Viegas, a primary school teacher, 
was reportedly killed after his arrest. The others who were 
reportedly protected by the intervention of their families were 
taken to Dili where they were held for a period in the former 
Portuguese barracks in Taibesse, 
- Also in November 1982, Joao Brito from Viqueque was 
reportedly executed by Indonesian soldiers in Venilale, Baucau 
after he had beaten an Indonesian soldier who had sexually 
molested his wife. 
- In about October 1982, F., who had surrendered the previous 
month, was reportedly publicly burnt to death in Ainaro. After 
his surrender, he had reportedly been recruited to work with the 
Indonesians and had been sent back to the bush with the task of 
inducing Fretilin followers to surrender. Sain after his return 
from the bush, the town of Ainaro was attacked. The 
Indonesians reportedly accused him of betraying them and 
burned him to death publicly as an example. 
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Amnesty protests against 
authorised torture in East Timor 
Amnesty International recently received a copy of 
manuals and guidelines issued in July,September 1982 by 
the Indonesian commander for East Timor and his 
intelligence chief to Indonesian military personnel in the 
Baucau district of East Tim or. 1 Contained in these 
manuals are guidelines which: 
1. Condone the use of physical and psychological torture in 
certain circumstances during interrogation and provide 
guidelines to prevent its exposure. [In the manual on 
Established Procedures on. Methods of Interrogating 
Captives, a section entitled ''things to be Avoided" 
contains a sub-section on the "Use of Force and Threats". 
It reads: 
It is hoped that interrogation with the use of force will not be 
implemented except in those situations where the person 
examined tells the truth with difficulty (is evasive) . 
However, if use of force is required there should not be a 
member of the local population (guides, members of the civil 
guard, ordinary people) present to witness it so that the 
antipathy of the people is not aroused. '. . 
Avoid taking photographs showing torture (taken of someone 
being given electric shocks, being stripped naked and so on). 
Remember that such ,documentation/photogra'phs should .not 
be printed freely outside/in Denpasar and obtained by 
irresponsible members of society.) · 
2. Condone the issuing of threats on the lives of persons 
undergoing interrogation to ensure their co-operation. [In 
the Technical Manual on Methods for Village Authorities 
to Break up the GPK (Fretilin) Support Networks, there is 
a guideline which states: 
Point out that their friends are still alive because they have 
given hone~t confessions and have been prepared to help the 
armed forces in the prompt restoration of security. 
3. Prescribe a policy of transporting Fretilin supporters 
and the families of Fretilin members still in the bush to 
Schoolgirls injured in clash 
with police 
Seven schoolgirls were injured when police attacked and broke 
up a protest demonstration of hundreds of schoolgirls in Jakarta 
after girls who were wearing headscarves had been refused entry 
into a school building. The police struck the girls with their rifle-. 
butts. Following this incident, many hundreds of girls all wearing 
headscarves and coming from many schools demonstrated 
outside the Ministry of Education protesting against this act of 
violence . Many were carrying posters demanding that they be 
allowed to exercise their constitutional right to practise their 
religious beliefs . · 
(Source: Radio Netherlands, (Hilversum) 19 August 1983) 
Muslim pupils face expulsion over 
headscarves 
Muslim girls who insist on wearing headscarves at school in 
accordance with their religious beliefs face the prospect of 
having to leave state schools. The Minister of Education, 
Professor Nugroho Natosusanto recently issued a press release 
stressing that girls are required to conform with regulations 
regarding school uniforms in every respect. "If there are pupils 
"determined places" including the island of Atauro. 
[Section 3d of the Technial Manual on Methods for Village 
Authorities to Break up the GPK (Fretilin) Support 
Networks states: 
Evacuate the network of GPK support still existing in the 
settlement as well as the families of GPK who have not yet 
been evacuated, to Atauro or other determined places. J 
On 20th July 1983, Amnesty International wrote to _ 
President Suharto bringing to his attention its concern that 
these manuals appeared to officially condone the .torture . 
and possibly even the killing of Fretilin supporters. 
Amnesty International urged President Suharto most 
strongly to issue immediate instructions to all forces under 
his command prohibiting the torture of prisoners in all 
circumstances. 
The Indonesian Government has responded to 
Amnesty's statement by denying that the Ministry of 
Defence and Security has issued any manuals specifically 
covering East Timor. A spokesman of the Minister of 
Defence and Security was quoted as saying, "we haye 
never issued such a manual for East Timor". He added 
that there was a general manual issued to all Indonesian . 
military units but declined to give details. He said that, as 
East Timor was considered to be a part of Indon'esian 
territory, no special manual would have been issued 
specifically covering East Timor. 
Amnesty International does not regard the Indonesian 
Government's response as satisfactory. Amnesty has said 
that the manuals in its possession were issued not by the 
Ministry of Defence and Security as · the spokesman 
seemed to imply but by the military command for East 
Timor, and Amnesty has no reason to doubt that they are 
genuine. 
Taken from Amnesty International's submission to the UN 
Decolonisation Commission, August 1983. 
1. Substantial extracts from these documents were reproduced in 
Special Supplement in TAPOL Bulletin No. 58, July 1983. 
who, for whatever reason, feel they must wear headscarves, the 
government will assist in their transfer to schools where the 
uniform incorporates headscarves". 
Regarding this new development in the dispute over 
headscarves, Tempo (20 August, 1983) wonders whether this 
means that girls refusing to take off their scarves will now be 
denied the opportunity of attending state schools . The issue has 
been raised on a number of occasions recently because of the 
resurgence of Muslim practices particularly among the younger 
generation. · 
Schoolgirls entering school. (Tempo, 20 August, 1983.) 
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Army killings continue: press 
reporting now banned 
Killings by Army death squads have continued unabated in the 
towns and cities of Indonesia. The difference now is that the 
press has been ordered to stop publishing reports of the killings. 
According to a UPI report from Jakarta on 5th August 
newspaper editors were told by phone that a new wave of killings 
was about to take place, described as being the ~'final assault to 
expurgate crime". Having been given this news, editors were 
then warned not to publish any more reports of killings because, 
according to Sukarno, the Director-General for Press Guidance 
at the Ministry of Information, "the recent reporting of the 
killings does not help to maintain peace and order". · 
On the very day this reporting ban was issued, the weekly 
magazine Tempo, appeared with a cover story on the death 
squads, still referred to as "the mysterious killings". 
The journal made the point that many who initially supported 
the "mysterious killings'~ as a form of shock-therapy are now 
getting worried. A leading Muslim, the chairman of the West 
Java Council of Ulama, E. Z. Muttaquien is quoted as saying: 
People felt relieved at first, but this is turning to anxiety that 
measures by people who are taking the law into their own hands will 
just go on and on. These murders, which are prohibited by religion, 
can lead to all kinds of things that could be disastrous. 
The growing public concern about the killings no doubt goes a 
long way to explaining the sudden ban on media coverage. 
Tempo reported (6th August, 1983) that news of killings was 
still being reported daily, often with photographs: six deaths in 
Wonosobo, Central Java, eight deaths in Pontianak, West 
Kalimantan, and several in Samarinda, East Kalimantan. A 
body discovered in the outskirts of Jakarta had no fewer than ten 
bullet wounds. There were signs that the victim had been trying 
to remove tattoo marks from his body. (See below.) Dr. Abdul 
Mun'im, forensic expert at the University of Indonesia, says 
some bodies have as many as eleven or twelve bullet wounds; 
one had five bullet wounds in the head alone. During May, June 
and July, he said, 69 bodies had been brought in for 
examination. The latest regional figures reported by Tempo were 
96 killings in Semarang and 89 in West Java. These are all figures 
of reported deaths; many deaths go unreported. 
According to Peter Hastings (Sydney Morning Herald, 8th 
August 1983) 1,400 have been killed since the death squads 
started their operations in March. 
More generals justify the killings 
General Amir Machmud, chairman of Parliament and the 
People's Assembly, has expressed full approval of the killings. 
The leadership of Parliament, he said, had discussed the "anti-
crime campaign" with the government and had come to the 
conclusion that it has been "very successful" because the number 
of crimes being committed has fallen sharply. [In the minds of · 
Indonesia's parliamentary leaders of course, extra-judicial 
murders by the State don't count as crimes, but as one western 
journal has pointed out, "Indonesia.is experiencing a crime-wave 
of a different sort" (The Economist, 30th July 1983) .] 
General Ali Murtopo who was Information Minister till 
March 1983 and is now Deputy Chairman of the Supreme 
Advisory Council, declared that these "justified" killings were 
being committed on the orders of the Department of Defence 
because "conventional methods to combat crime have proved 
inappropriate in Indonesia" . This is the first time the Defence 
Department has been publicly linked in this way. Murtopo also 
asserted that "drastic measures" are needed to prevent the 
emergence of terrorists groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy 
and the Japanese Red Army" (Reuter/APF, 29th July 1983) . 
According to Max Lane who visited Indonesia recently, 
there does not seem to be any mystery about (the killings) in Jakarta. 
Most informed people are convinced that those responsible are 
members of Detachment 801-the anti-terrorist squad of the elite 
paratroop battalion, Kopassandha. (National Times, 19-25 August 
1983.) 
Lane also reported the widely held view that General Benny 
Murdani, the new ABRI commander (himself a product of 
Kopassandha) is using the campaign to fashion for himself a 
corps of soldiers upon whom he could rely to carry out any 
order, including murder. "There was a widespread fear that the 
next target might be political opponents of the regime" , Lane 
wrote. 
Prisoners fear release 
The Director of Cipinang Prison, Jakarta's largest prison for 
convided prisoners, told Tempo that 95 per cent of the victims of 
the killings in Jakarta were people who had been released from 
Cipinang. "Some released prisoners have been murdered within 
a day or two of their release" , he said. There are prisoners who 
have written to the authorities pleading to be allowed to stay in 
prison even though their term of imprisonment has expired . 
From some towns there are reports that people leaving prison 
have immediately committed a ' crime so as to be re-arrested and 
return to the safety of a jail. 
No wonder then that the release ceremonies on 17 August, 
when many prisoners were allowed home as part of the annual 
amnesty on Indonesia's national day, were far from being happy 
occasions. Released prisoners were quickly bundled into 
vehicles and driven off to secret destinations by waiting relatives . 
·~ 
Dessin de FRANCHINI 
continued on 
page 21 
Taken from Le Monde, 14 August, 1983, "L'extermination des 
tatoues". 
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The mysterious jeep on the 
Cimedang ~ridge 
One evening in mid-June , a dark-coloured 
jeep drew up in the middle of the bridge 
over the river Cimedang, which lies at about 
70km east of Tasikmalaya and marks the 
boundary between the kabupaten of Ciamis 
and that ofTasikmalaya. A few of the local 
people on night-watch saw the vehicle halt 
in the middle of the bridge, do a U-turn, and 
then race off eastwards again, in the 
direction from which it had first appeared . _ 
carry the body down to the south sea, which 
is about 18km from the Cimedang bridge . 
"Since that first incident, the dark-
coloured jeep has gone past our village and 
stopped on the bridge about once every two 
nights," explained Icang, another villager 
from Tawang. And it has been established 
that the day after every visit from the jeep, 
another body covered with wounds is found 
caught fast on the river bank. 
caught somewhere on the eastern bank. 
Then it's the turn of those on that side to 
push it back into midstream. 
The discovery of these . mysterious 
bodies has resulted in making those who 
Jive along the river banks feel ill-at-ease if 
they bathe or wash in the river. They are 
afraid that a floating corpse will suddenly 
appear. The fishermen are _ also 
complaining. Nobody will buy fish caught in 
the river for fear that they might have fed 
off a human corpse. 
That incident might not have attracted 
any attention at all, had not on the following 
day a local man living near the bridge found 
a dead body caught fast in tree roots on the 
western bank of the river. "On the throat of 
the corpse was a gaping wound, the head 
was shattered, and blood had flowed from 
the mouth, nose and the throat-wound," 
said Sabeni (not his real name), a fisherman 
from Sindangsari village, kecamatan 
Cimerak, kabupaten Ciamis. 
None of the local inhabitants has any 
intention of going closer to find out about 
the mysterious jeep's business. "A villager's 
duty is to farm. These killings are the affair 
of those in authority," said lcang. Up until 
the week before Lebaran, people living 
along the river banks had found 18 corpses, 
one of which ·was female. None bore any 
indication of identity , though all were 
tattooed. Death was caused either by the 
head being shattered or by strangulation 
with nylon string. None of the "findings" 
were reported to the local police . 
The inhabitants of both villages are 
unanimous in wishing to regi:;ter a 
complaint so that no more bodies are 
dumped in the river. But who should they 
complain to? Aren't the agents of the 
mysterious killings unknown? Through a 
number of journalists who have visited the 
area, they have appealed for bodies to be 
left lying at the roadside. "We will bury 
them," said a local community figure . With 
that in mind, the local people dug three 
graves in a garden in Sindangsari just after 
Lebaran. But that was clearly wasted effort: 
since then there have been no more 
mysterious bodies seen floating in 
Cimedang river, and the three grave-holes 
still lie open . 
There were no clues as to the identity of 
the body, that of a man in his thirties, except 
that it was covered in tattoos . The villager, 
who was on his way to bathe in the river , 
pushed the body out into midstream, where 
it was carried off downriver. "We don't 
want to get involved with the police , so we 
didn't report the body," explained one of 
the villagers of Tawang, kecamatan Panca 
Tengah, kabupaten Tasikmalaya. The local 
community hoped that the current would 
·The villagers of Sindangsari and Tawang 
appear to have no intention of burying the 
bodies they find. "The dead person was a 
recidivist who'd been corroding the public 
all this time, wasn't he?" said Kasni (not his 
real name), who lives in Sindangsari. If the 
body_ drifts over to the west bank of the river 
on the Tasikmalaya side, the villagers push 
it out midstream, after which it usually gets [Translated from Tempo, 6 August, 1983.] 
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,some events in Indonesia 
Within the past six weeks it has 
been reported in Indonesian 
newspapers that hundreds of 
"criminals" have slaughtered each 
other in what has been put down to 
internecine gang warfare. · 
Gangs exist, and norinally · one 
might accept that such ·underworld 
friction has blown 'up. But the 
coincidence that the cull has taken 
place simultaneously in many of 
Indonesia's major cities is too much 
to overlook. In Jakarta the death toll 
is unknown. Twenty corpses ·were 
reported lying in the morgue 
awaiting family identification. In 
Yogyakarta .- local people talk of 
hundreds shot and dumped down a 
well near Parangtritis (memories of 
the abortive Communist coup in 
1965 when "Crocodile . Hole" at 
Jakarta's Halim Airport became the 
disposal pit for 8 generals) . Cool hit 
men on motorbikes have been 
witnessed. A ,mari with "cropped 
hair and military bearing" casually 
shot dead a youth on the steps of one 
of Jakarta's main shopping centres. 
The police, we are told, are 
investigating. But there is little need 
to play charades; everyo-ne knows 
the truth. 
were criminals, protectionists , 
recidivists. They wore tattoos. This 
was proof enough of their guilt. 
Certainly, In(:l.onesia suffers the 
misery of criminals being _ loose in 
society. The people are therefore 
understandably relieved that many 
have now been removed. I myself 
feel relief. But thinking people here, 
of whom some do remain, are highly 
concerned that, as Indonesia 
becomes increasingly accepted into 
the world family of nations 
favoured by the mighty, we are 
losing all control of our destiny. 
I am an ordinary Indonesian; with 
a young family. I have no political 
interests, and I love my country. But 
I see around me a degenerating 
society which is delighted to 
condone its police and military 
(whose members themselves come 
fror:i the lower end of the 
educational spectrum) in the whole- · 
sale murder of suspected criminals. 
Suspected criminals. No arrest, no 
trial - only execution. Where is the 
line drawn between suspected 
criminal, and either suspected 
dissenter, or suspected opposition to 
a regime which cannot be removed 
by the popular vote? 
If we allow our overlords such 
will ever clean up the graft, 
corruption and total abandonment 
of moral principle which openly and 
contemptuously permeates every 
level of Indonesian society? 
Surely, if a man will kill , will he 
not corrupt and steal as well? And if 
society remains silent over institu· 
tionalised murder, then will it not 
prostrate itself in everything, and 
continue to have its rich and 
powerful ride rough-shod for ever? 
Our state philosophy, P~ncasila, 
proclaims social justice. You are 
invited to Visit Jakarta's Pondok 
Indah (Beautiful Cottage), a suburb 
of palatial Grecian residences, and 
then talk to the beggars of my city 
whose only defence against the 
night is a cardboard box. Then call 
on the families of suspected 
recidivists whose bo<'.lies lie equally 
cold in the city morgue. 
That, Sir, is the social justice of 
Pancasila. · 
Publication of a letter such as this 
would lead to the severest con-
sequences for my family, my friends 
and for myself should my name be 
stated. I hope you will understand 
therefore my wish to withhold both 
my name and address. 
total control as they now have, who Name and address supplied . 
"We needed this clean-up" , the 
people say. After all the victims 
....._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ·~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~--~~-J 
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Lawyers escape kidnap 
attempt 
Two barefoot lawyers from East Java have fled to Jakarta from 
Blitar to escape kidnap attempts which, they believe, were made 
to eliminate them because of their defence of peasants involved 
in land disputes. They are seeking legal protection and help from 
the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Jakarta, and refuse to return 
home without assurances for their safety from the authorities . 
They fear for their lives because a lawyer colleague was the 
victim of a similar kidnap and has since disappeared (see box). 
One of the two lawyers, Umardani Kumboyono, has been 
involved since 1976 in fighting for the interests of about 1,400 
peasant families in several districts of east Java whose land is 
now owned and controlled by local military officers or by private 
companies operating with official protection. The land dispute in 
Blitar concerns 110 hectares of land which was taken from a 
large number of peasants in the pre-1965 period. But when, after 
1965, the man who had been given control of the land was taken 
into custody in the 1965 arrests, the land was re-distributed to a 
number of local military officers . Initially, because of the post-
1965 political complexities, the peasants were afraid to challenge 
the new owners . But in the mid-1970s, they sought Umardani's 
help to get the land back . This case resulted in Umardani himself 
being arrested and tried for mis-appropriating his clients' money. 
After a year in prison, he was found guilty and sentenced to 18 
months in prison on the evidence of one witness, even'though 
the peasants had themselves testified in court that the charge was 
a fabrication (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 48, September 1981, 
page 6). 
In another district, Umardani has fought to secure the' return 
of land expropriated, purportedly for government projects but 
which is now in private hands and is being used as a coffee 
plantation. Angered by the enormous profits the present owners 
are earning from their land, the peasants recently raided the 
property and helped themselves to part of the produce. Peasants 
were arrested, and Umardani was summoned for questioning 
and accused of inciting the peasants. Although he was permitted 
to return home , a group of men called a few days later, ordering 
him to accompany them. Since it was late at night and a 
neighbour had time to warn him that one of the men sitting the 
vehicle was holding a shovel, Umardani dec:ded to make a bolt 
for it. He escaped through the back door, swam across a river 
and trekked three days till he arrived in Malang. There he met 
up with another lawyer, Santoso, who had also received a late-
night summons and had fled , for fear of his lik 
Years of service to peasants 
Umardani has been helping peasants for years as a "pokrol 
bambu" or barefoot lawyer, having had no formal legal training. , 
He is a pensioned low-ranking policeman and has devoted much 
time and energy to protecting the interests of people who, as he 
says, "are ignorant of the law and confront constant abuse by 
people in positions of power intent upon expropriating their 
land rights" . Members of the LBH group of lawyers in Jakarta 
have praised him for his tremendous courage in the face of 
continual harassment . 
~---~~..:....~~~~...:..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--. 
The Lawyer who "Disappeared" 
Dahayu was, like Umarda·n a barefoot lawyer who worked as Umardani's assistant. 
He was deeply involved in defending the interests of peasants in the village of 
Sumberwuluh, Candipuro, East Java. He had, on one occasion in 1981, visited 
Jakarta to report one particular case to Parliament and to the central "Clean-up" 
Operation (Opstibpus) . 
In September last year, a group of men visited Dahayu and told him he should call 
at the local government office to pick up some money he had been promised as a 
loan. He drove off with the men but never returned home, and disappeared without 
trace. His wife later received warnings not to raise complaints about her husband's 
disappearance or the same fate would befall her. 
Umardani is fully convinced that Dahayu was kidnapped and killed because of his 
resolute defence of peasants and challenge to those in authority. And it was with 
Dahayu's experience in mind that Umardani himself decided to take no chances 
when he was confronted with a similar kind of "summons" . 
Papuan kills Indonesian 
in revenge for barbarism 
A West Papuan refugee in Papua New Guinea, Frederick Simon 
Allom, who was tried in August for killing an Indonesian 
embassy official last year told the court in Port Moresby that he 
had killed his victim out of revenge for treatment he and his 
family had suffered under Indonesian rule in West Papua. 
He told the court his father had been hanged by Indonesian 
soldiers, then decapitated. His mother, in a state of pregnancy, 
had been disembowelled, her limbs cut off, then thrown into a 
fire. He had also witnessed his two brothers and two sisters being 
killed by Indonesian troops. 
He himself had been tortured in an Indonesian prison, and 
had been forced to stand half submerged in excreta. One of the 
Indonesian officials who had assaulted him while in prison was 
Meinard Poluan, the man whom he later killed in Port Moresby. 
Explaining how and why he h.ad killed Poluan, the accuse_d man 
also said Poluan was a spy and had attempted to recruit him. 
The court found Allom guilty but Chief Justice Sir Buri Kidu, 
in passing a sentence of 15 years, said he did not impose a life 
sentence because of the unchallenged evidence that Allom's 
family had been killed by the Indonesians . . "I think any 
reasonable man would resort to what you did," he said. 
(Sunday Sun, Suva, Fiji, 21 August 1983) 
continued from page 19 
Most Victims have Tattoos 
Many of the groups of young people, the so-called gali-gali have 
tattoos of snakes, dragons and garuda birds. This has become 
part ·of the sub-culture among many young unemployed people 
who now roam the streets. But today, tattoo marks are enough 
to attract the killers, which is why there has been a sudden rush 
by those who can afford it to have tattoos removed by plastic 
surgery, and those who cannot afford it, try to remove their 
tattoo marks with hot irons and acid. Recently an Indonesian 
arrived in Holland to ask for political asylum. He has many 
tattoo marks on his body and his life is therefore at risk. 
ICJ Reports to UN Human Rights Body ~ 
The International Commission of Jurists raised the issue of the 
killings in Indonesia at the August meeting of the UN Sub-
Commission on Minorities and Discrimination, a sub-division of 
the UN Human Rights Commission. In a press release on 29 
August, the ICJ deplores the killings and says: 
Whatever the failure of the law enforcement agencies to contain the 
rising crime rate, nothing can justify the summary execution of 
suspected criminals . Fears are already being expressed in Indonesia 
that similar methods could in future be resorted to for eliminating 
political opponents . 
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IGGI commends military regime 
for its political courage 
This year's meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia was full of praise for the "political courage" shown by 
the Indonesian military government in adopting firm economic 
measures to cope with the harmful effects of the world economic 
recession and falling oil prices . The general consensus of 
delegates from IGGI member governments and international 
financial institutions was that Indonesia is to be congratulated for 
cutting food and petroleum subsidies, for devaluing the rupiah by 
38.5 per cent .and for introducing stringent fiscal measures and 
freezing the salaries of government employees, all of which have 
worsened living standards of the poor. 
The communique issued at the end of the meeting co_mmended 
Indonesia for coping with unfavourable international economic 
developments without compromising the principle offree trade or 
neglecting the needs of long-term development. Indonesia's 
exemplary style of economy management and the caution it has 
shown in borrowing internationally will guarantee that the 
international capital market remains open to Ind~mesia, the 
communique said . 
Manifesting firm confidence in Indonesia 's style of economic 
development, the 1983 IGGI meeting agreed to provide 
Indonesia with a total of $2,240.41 million in credit , $20 million 
more than the amount proposed by the World Bank. The final 
total for 1983 could well reach $2,300 million when West 
Germany and British credits, still to be fixed , are announced . At 
this level, the 1983 IGGI total will exceed the 1982 total ($1,925 
million) by no less than $375 million. 
These complimentary remarks about Indonesia's "political 
courage" were made at a time when Indonesian newspapers were 
reporting daily the nationwide slaughter of criminals by Army 
death squads in an attempt to reduce the level of crime against 
property . But the brutality of this campaign of extra-judicial 
murder by government which is the chosen method of the military 
to cope with crime, itself a consequence of the worsening economic 
conditions-in particular for the millions of unemployed 
youngsters, was lost on the IGGI delegates. The IGGI 
chairperson, Dutch Minister · for Overseas Development, Mrs 
E. M. Schoo had been told in detail about the activities of these 
death squads by the Legal Aid Institute when she visited 
Indonesia just a few weeks before the IGGI meeting, but she 
made no reference to the killings in her opening address to the 
IGGI meeting . 
Multilateral and Bilateral Credit in 1983/84 
Seventy-five per cent of the credit agreed this year will be pro-
vided multilaterally. Credit pledged at the meeting includes the 
following (comparative figures for 1982 are given in brackets): 
World Bank 






$1,200 million ($925 million) 
$400 million ($345 million) 
$106 million ($95 million) 
Yen 67 million ( 63 .17 billion) 
$32 million ($33 million 
A$46 million (A$38 million) 
f 160 million (f160 million) 
IGGI aid commitments, 1969/1970 to 1983/1984 (in millions of dollars) . From Tempo, 25 June, 1983. 
2.240,4 
Source: 1983/1984 budget 
Supreme Court upholds 
another death sentence 
The death sentence passed against Ruslan Wijayasastra, who 
was deputy chairman of the peasants' oganisation , Barisan Tani 
Indonesia until it was outlawed in 1965 , has been upheld by the 
Supreme Court. The Court's decision is based on a technicality 
because, it declares , the convicted man failed to submit a 
petition explaining the reasons for his request to the Court to 
1.993,1 1.974,3 
*as at 30 September 1983 
grant cassation of his sentence. From the press report of the 
Court's decision, it appears that Ruslan did submit a request for 
cassation but did not present the necessary explanations which 
should have reached the court within 14 days after the request 
was made . Nothing was said as to whether Ruslan would have 
been provided the necessary facilities to make such a submission . 
The Supreme Court's decision means that the only means 
Ruslan Wijayasastra now has to commute his death sentence is 
by a plea for clemency to the President. It is not yet known 
whether he intends to pursue such a course. 
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Book Review 
Timar: A People Betrayed, James Dunn. 
The Jacaranda Press, 65 Park Road, 
Queensland, l<ustralia. 1983. ($A15.95) 
. . 
Although many articles and short texts 
have been published on various aspects of 
East Timor and Indonesia's attempted an-
nexation of the territory, there are only a 
small number of.works that provide a com-
prehensive overview .1 Hence the. timely 
publication of Timar: a People Betrayed, 
by James (Jim) Dunn. 
To those who have followed events in 
East Timor; Dunn is a familiar figure. To 
others, his credentials speak for them-
selves. He was formerly Australian Consul 
in East Timor from 1962-4, he visited the 
country for two month periods in 1974 and 
1975. On the first of these visits he was a 
member of an Australian Foreign Affairs 
mission, and on the second the head of an 
Australian Council for Overseas Aid team. 
His sources are many ·and diverse: inter-
views with hundreds of Timorese refugees, 
leaders of political parties, information 
from sensitively-placed Indonesian sources, 
and visitors to East Tim or, together with 
(and perhaps most importantly for his pur-
poses) sources in the Australian diplomatic 
community. 
Dunn provides a brief histor-ical 
introduction, focusing on the eco-nomic 
and social impact of Portuguese 
colonialism on East Timor. His early chap-
ters encapsulate all the main aspects -
particularly the results of political change 
on the former kingdoms of East Tim or. 
More could have been presented on the 
transformation of · the East Timorese eco-
nomy, and, perhaps, on the characteristics 
of rural society (although some of these are 
dealt with elsewhere in a number of an-
thropological works). Reading Dunn's 
early chapters one gains the impression 
that they are not the author's main con-
cern. This is affirmed when one reaches the 
fourth chapter, dealing with the Lisbon 
coup and the emergence of political parties 
in East Timor. Here both the material pre-
sented and its analysis are superb - par-
ticularly the section on the Timorese 
Democratic Union (UDT)-and its relations 
with Fretilin, as they emerged into 
prominence as parties in 1974. For me, the 
high points of Dunn's work after this are 
his analysis of Operasi Komodo (General 
Murtopo's long-term plan to annexe East 
Timor) and its tortuous implementation, 
together with his account of the Australian 
government's betrayal of East Timor. The 
latter outlines succinctly the appalling 
records of the Whitlam and Fraser 
governments. On many occasions, argues 
Dunn, they could have intervened to 
curtail Indonesia's brutal invasion · by 
providing negotiating alternatives; yet 
ministers resolutely ignored such oppor-
tunities in their determined stance of 
support for Suharto's Orde Baru. 
Any doubts as to the severity of Indo-
nesia's military suppression of the people 
of East Timor are rapidly dispelled by 
Dunn's chapter ten, "Invasion, occupation 
and resistance" . His conclusions are estab-
Eshed through a rigorous cross-referencing 
of refugee accounts, eye-witness reports , 
church sources in East Timor, and Indo-
nesian , US and Australian diplomatic 
papers. Some of the resultant accounts are 
horrendous. To choose one event, in May 
1976, as an example from many: 
. . . one of the bloodiest incidents occurred 
in Lamaknan . . . , in the border area. There 
Indonesian troops who had been badly 
mauled by Fretilin units took their venge-
ance on a large refugee settlement which 
housed some 5,000 to 6,000 people in 
temporary shelters, according to Timorese 
who had served as truck drivers for the 
Indonesian force ... The troops set fire to 
several of the houses , causing the Timorese 
to protest angrily. According to witnesses, 
the troops then turned their guns on the 
refugee community for several hours, 
shooting down men, women and children 
... According to one of the truck drivers, 
about 2,000 people were killed on that day . 
(Dunn, p. 303) . 
In documenting this incident Dunn out-
lines what Indonesian government propa-
ganda was presenting at the time, how the 
witnesses came by their information, how 
it was received in the diplomatic com-
munity, and so on. The documentation is 
rigorous , the evidence seems irrefutable. 
This is typical of Dunn's approach. Hence 
the importance of his analysis - it can be 
ignored, and its conclusions challenged, 
but the evidence is overwhelming. It gives 
yet more concrete content to the 
allegations of genocide against the people 
of East Timor by the Indonesian military. 
Since Dunn's work will be taken -
quite rightly - as one of the most authori-
tative works on East Timor, one feels 
bound to note a number of its limitations . 
Firstly, I found its portrayal of 
Suharto's role rather paradoxical. On the 
one hand, we are informed that Suharto 
and a small grouping of generals organised 
the 1965--6 coup in Indonesia, and that this 
tightly knit group orchestrated the incor-
poration of West Papua (West Irian) : Yet, 
when it comes to East Timor, we are pre-
sented with a restrained Suharto, whose 
hands are suddenly being forced by more 
. hawkish generals such as Murtopo and 
Murdani. Indeed, we are even shown a 
Suharto whose hopes are somehow dashed 
when Whitlam tacitly supports arme.d in-
tervention. This scenario seems rather un-
likely; Suharto is the task-master of the 
puppet-show, presenting a pacifying face 
which conceals the most hawkish of 
policies, often at the expense of surround-
ing generals; the most elaborate ideo-
logical games can be played to out-
manoeuvre even the · most minor general. 
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There is little doubt that Suharto was com-
mitted to Operasi Komodo from its incep-
tion. What concerned him, rather, was the 
campaign's at times rather vulgar brutish 
appearance , which he sought to ameliorate 
internationally. 
I . also feel that in his condemnation of 
Australian and American diplomacy, 
Dunn is unnecessarily tolerant of the 
Portuguese government's role. No account 
of the "turbulence" of political events in 
Lisbon after the April coup can excuse 
successive Portuguese governments' vascil-
lations. On many occasions, as the former 
colonial power, the Portuguese govern-
ment could have successfully resisted the 
strident demands of Indonesia's out-
rageous "negotiators" . Rather , it chose to 
accord the people of East Timor a low 
priority, and all Portuguese governments 
(with the exception of the Presidency in the 
more recent past) have preferred ultimate-
ly to sweep the problem under the table by 
quietly acquiescing to Indonesian integra-
tion in a more gentlemanly manner. A 
reading of papers assembled from govern· 
ment archives by Loff Barreto,2 which 
Dunn quotes, seems to substantiate this 
point. 
John Taylor 
1. The most important of these being Jill 
Jolliffe's work, East Timor, Nationalism and 
Colonialism. 
2. The Timor Drama. Joao Loff Barreto. A 
Timor Newsletter Publication, Lisbon, 1981. 
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Former political prisoner 
sues government 
A former political prisoner who was charged and tried for 
alleged involvement in the 1965 events is to sue the government 
for unjustified imprisonment for a period of 872 days . This is the 
first time ever that a former PKI prisoner is to take such an 
action. 
Hadi Soerono was until 1965 chairman of the Samarinda 
branch of the left-wing cultural organisation, LEKRA, deputy 
secretary of the Samarinda PKI , a former _headmaster of a 
Muhamadiya secondary school and teacher at a Muslim teachers' 
college . He was arrested in December 1967. He is being repre-
sented in his lawsuit by two lawyers of the Jakarta Legal Aid 
Bureau (LBH). 
Soerono was held without charge until May 1975 when he was 
transferred from the hands of the army security command, KOP-
KAMTIB, to the Public Prosecution authorities, pending his 
trial later that year. In November 1975 ,_ he was tried and 
sentenced to 13 years with deduction for the time served. The 
verdict made it clear that the entire period of imprisonment was 
included in the deductible period. Had this decision been 
properly observed, together with remission · to which prisoners 
are automatically entitled, he should have been released in 
December 1979. 
However, the prison governor insisted that his deductible 
period only covered his period of detention by the public prose-
cutor's office. His grounds for claiming this was a circular issued 
in March 1976 by the Supreme Court which made a distinction 
between "non-justitial custody", ie. detention by unauthorised 
bodies like KOPKAMTIB, and "justitial custody", ie . that which 
could be acknowledged by the judicial authorities. (The 
Supreme Court circular caused great confusion at the time and 
was criticised precisely for creating the kind of extra injustice to 
which Hadi Soerono has been the victim (see TAPOL Bulletin 
No 21, 1977). 
Early in 1982, the prisoner's wife wrote to the LBH in 
Jakarta . The Jakarta newspaper, Kompas, reported the case on 
5th May that year, and it was on that very day that the prison 
governor in Samarinda summoned Hadi Soerono to tell him that 
he was being released immediately. Hadi Soerono was so 
surprised at this sudden tum of events that he initially refused to 
leave until he knew the basis for this unexpected decision. After 
further clarification, he left the prison but did not abandon his 
determination, strongly supported by the LBH, to sue the 
government for damages. He is suing for Rp25,000 per day for 
the 872 days in question plus RplOO million for gross injustice 
done. 
But can a prisoner sue for damages concerning a period of 
"non-justitial custody"? The Vice-Chairman of the Supreme 
Court has expressed his doubts. "If the prisoner is tried then 
acquitted, or if he is held and never tried, he would be entitled to 
damages. But if he is tried and sentenced, then there is no 
question of damages." If this interpretation is correct , Soerono 
could lose his case merely because he was tried. But at the same 
time, many tens of thousands of former prisoners would be 
entitled to damages, the majority for up to 14 years of detention 
by KOPKAMTIB. Hadi Soerono's case could open up a whole , 
new issue for the legal system, and for tens of thousands of 
former prisoners, the vast majority of whom were never charged 
.or tried. 
(Source: Tempo, 3 September, 1983) 
New anti-PKI purges in progress 
A new purge of "former PKI people is being 
conducted in the Department of Labour. 
Already seventeen people have been 
dismissed and many more could be 
affected, because a number of employees 
are currently under investigation . Similarly 
purges are unqer way in other departments 
too. 
The people in question are those who, 
during the nationwide purges and 
"screening" operations that took place in 
the wake of the 1965 military takeover, 
were classified as CI and CU. All A and B 
category people were arrested as well as 
many Cs . But some Cs were not in the event 
arrested or dismissed . Yet now, nearly 18 
years later, the witch-hunters are at it again . 
The new Minister of Labour, Admiral 
Sudomo, formerly commander of the 
Army's security command, KOPKAMTIB, 
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announced last month that "eventually all 
CI and CII people will be dismissed, in 
accordance with government regulations" . 
Former PKI Member Provoked by "PKI-
baiting" 
The news of this current purge came to light 
in an item in Tempo (20 August, 1983) 
reporting that a Department of Labour 
employee, Ngiso Adhiwahono, has been 
arrested for the murder of another 
department official. Confessing to the 
murder, Ngiso complained bitterly that the 
victim, his superior, had baited him for 
years for being "ex-PKI". His feelings of 
anxiety deepened recently when it became 
apparent that the new purge was under way 
and that he could soon be dismissed. He 
told the police that he had asked his 
superior whether ,_rumours about his own 
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dismissal were true; when answered in an 
extremely hostile manner, he lost control 
and stabbed the man to death. 
SUBSCRIPTION RATES 










Overseas - airmail 
£10.00 
£14.00 
T APO L's Giro account number: 
56 781 4009 
Overseas subscribers please note: all 
cheques not drawn on a London bank 
must add the equivalent of £1.50 to 
cover bank charges. 
Subscribers from non-EEC European 
countries should also bear this in mind. 
Australian subscribers can pay to : 
Mr . Siauw Giok Djin · 
19 Rosella Avenue, 
South Clayton 
Victoria 3169 
Subscriptions and correspondence to: 
TAPOL 
8a, Treport Street, 
London SW18 2BP, UK 
